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1. 
Religion, Philosophy, and Science 
The Question of Epistemic Authority  
 
 
 At the root of all inquiries and approaches to religion is the question “what is 
religion?” and in accordance with the particular approach of choice, definitions have been 
suggested in response, none of which conclusive. There is in fact around six hundred 
definitions of religion within academia today. This paper suggests that a reflection on this 
fact of proliferation is a venture for philosophy, and is potentially illuminating with regards to 
the “question of religion” within the “human sciences”. Philosophy itself has a reflective and 
directly redefining relationship to its own identity, its place in the academic/scientific 
endeavor, and no less with regards to its subfield the “philosophy of religion”. It becomes 
primary that we first ask about philosophy of religion as a particular activity, and then its 
relation to the scientific/academic study of religion. What then is meant by the “philosophy of 
religion”? What does it mean that “religion” be dealt with philosophically? 
 
1.1 Philosophy of Religion: Between “philosophy and religion” and “philosophy of 
religion” 
As there can be no answer to this question that obtains universally, a starting point 
could be observed in the difference assumed in the conjunction between Eastern and Western 
appropriations. One would have to raise the question of what is philosophy itself, if it figures 
so differently in these overarching conceptual traditions of “East” and “West” as Winston L. 
King chooses to distinguish them in his introduction to Keiji Nishitani’s book Religion and 
Nothingness. King observes that, 
  
“[a] basic difficulty that stares us in the face immediately…is the differing relation of philosophy and 
religion in East and West…For us in the West, religion and philosophy have been two ever since the 
time of the Greek philosophers. For though the Catholic theological tradition incorporated Aristotle 
into its theology and Platonism into its experience, philosophy never lost its independence, even in the 
Middle Ages. In the early modern period it asserted its independence anew under the impulse of 
humanism and the new empirical sciences.” (W.L. King, in Nishitani’s Religion and Nothingness, viii). 
 
 
An independence that is metaphorically represented by the geographical separation 
between Athens and Jerusalem, the focal points of these two influences of Western tradition. 
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An independence and a separation that is less obvious and familiar in an Eastern context of 
“philosophy and religion”, where both are seen to have the final purpose of the salvation of 
man. Through this, entering into mutual dialogue, in contrast to the justificatory and 
evidentiary modes of engagement well presented in the two concerns of philosophy of 
religion according to the Cambridge Dictionary”: coherence and actual existence. 
 
The subfield of philosophy devoted to the study of religious phenomena…In the major theistic 
traditions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the most important of these claims concerns the existence, 
nature, and activities of God. Such traditions commonly understand God to be something like a person 
who is disembodied, eternal, free, all-powerful, all-knowing, the creator and sustainer of the universe, 
and the proper object of human obedience and worship. One important question is whether this 
conception of the object of human religious activity is coherent; another is whether such a being 
actually exists.” (Audi, 696). 
  
 Indeed, neither Eastern nor Western philosophies of religion can be seen under 
monolithic overarching terms. Many Western philosophers and thinkers attempted exactly 
such an “explanation of Christian religious experience”. Coming to mind now are Meister 
Eckhart, Augustine, and Kierkegaard. On the other hand, Zen philosophy cannot be equated 
with Sufism for instance, but where there is a common and fruitful mutual and comparative 
ground is where both begin; the existential and “perceptual” primacy of the human individual 
that permeates both disciplines. The case of Keiji Nishitani is illuminating precisely because 
as King describes him, he is an example of an “Eastern Buddhist philosopher…coming 
westward to make his case, equipped with a considerable knowledge of Christian and 
Western thought. This,” King continues, “is something quite different from the usual Zen-
Western encounter, in which there is on the one side the Eastern Sage who deliberately 
mystifies the Westerner with an array of Koans which must be either appropriated in the 
esoteric Zen manner or altogether left alone, and on the other side the Westerner who 
registers frustrated or devout bemusement.” (Nishitani, vii) Such encounters, and this is 
partially why Nishitani is relevant here, are also commonly experienced with Sufi pedagogy 
and language use, and in a sense, the intention of this paper is to explore the value and 
relevance of such “mystifying” encounters, not between “east” and “west” per se, but 
between the academic role and the religious address to our understanding of religion in 
general, and to the study of religion in particular. The final Chapter on Niffari, is particularly 
helpful in connecting this question of intentional mystification with the type of pedagogy, 
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epistemology, and communication that gears into the form of “religious authority” 
formulated in this paper as prescription.  
 
1.2 What is meant by philosophy of religion?  
The word “religion”, being such an ambiguous and mystifying term demands from us 
that we start as is already implied, not from where we believe religion is represented or 
located (in God, in believer, in culture, in society, etc.), but where we think we are standing 
in relation to it. When I say “we”, I do not mean any particular person or collective, but there 
are two main ways in which I can interpret this “we” in view of religion. There is the 
collective “we” of life, of humanity, the social body, family, religious affiliation, nation, 
umma, Church or scientific community. The operation and search for “religion” therein, is 
therefore conceived within a social/collective/public/demonstrable framework; religion as a 
social phenomenon, or the conception of “religion” as the spirit of the collective and visible 
in its social structures and cultural “evidence”. In this sense, the study of “religion” is 
objective, it searches for organizational structures, relations to authority, secularization 
processes, religious movements, coherent typologies and cultural forms, all of them sharing 
in common a certain independence from the “religious” as an address, and fulfilling a central 
requirement of objectivity; empirically verifiable “religious phenomenon”. Since religion is a 
shared reality, a value-sharing system, objective inquiry into the world surrounding the 
phenomena of religion is a responsibility with regards to the public, to history, to politics, and 
in general to safeguard religion itself from monopoly, and retrieve a portion of objective 
responsibility from the grip of ideological and “subjective” responses.  
There is on the other hand the “we” which is actually an “I”, the divided self of any 
human subjectivity in the face of the religious address, therefore, the search for and operation 
of religion therein, is conceived within the boundaries of the “Single Individual” as 
Kierkegaard has it, or a conception of religion that addresses the inwardness of subjective 
human existence, in its non-societal, non-communal dimension, even if that address calls for 
community. Reflecting on Kierkegaard’s text (Kierkegaard, 21, 1843) , Derrida writes in The 
Gift of Death, 
 
For common sense, just as for philosophical reasoning, the most widely spread belief is that 
responsibility is tied to the public and the nonsecret, to the possibility and even necessity of accounting for 
one’s words and actions in front of others, of justifying and owning up to them. Here on the contrary it 
appears, just as necessarily, that absolute responsibility of my actions, to the extent that such a 
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responsibility remains mine, singularly so, something no one else can perform in my place, instead implies 
secrecy. (Derrida, p. 60, 1996)  
 
Can we similarly make a conceptual difference between a “general religion” and an 
“absolute religion”, in which the latter is conceived within the bounds of the “single 
individual”, and which then allows for a renewable relationship with the religious text by 
virtue of the individual being “higher than the universal”? This touches upon another 
question. Who is the proto or archetypical “believer” from whom so-called empirical 
religious data is collected?  
It has become established that the area where definitions in the strictest academic sense 
become more and more impossible, multiple, and contextual, has been the social and human 
sciences, the study of religion being its peak representation. (Massimo, 49-67) I interpret this 
to mean, not definitively, that the closer to the self the phenomenon under consideration or 
observation is, the less the consensus on “what it is” or “where it is” is attained with any 
certainty, exactness, or comprehensiveness1 (Pals, p. 3, 2006). The question of this paper 
then, is not about religion directly, but about the “question of religion”, that is, the process by 
which religion is studied. 
 
1.3 Nishitani’s Existential Reversal of the Question 
According to Nishitani, there is a utilitarian concern that underlies the very question of 
religion, in its most object-oriented form of “What is religion?” and which can be re-stated to 
be “what is the purpose of religion for us?” He goes further in his remark to say,  
 
“[o]ne can ask about the utility of things like eating for the natural life, or of things like learning and the arts for 
culture. In fact, in such matters the question of utility should be of constant concern. Our ordinary mode of 
being is restricted to these levels of natural or cultural life. But it is in breaking though that ordinary mode of 
being and overturning it from the ground up, in pressing us back to the elemental source of life where life itself 
is seen as useless, that religion becomes something we need—a must for human life.” (Nishitani, 2, 1982) 
 
Nishitani notes two premises, firstly, that “religion is at all times the individual affair of 
each individual…Accordingly, we cannot understand what religion is from the outside. The 
religious quest alone is the key to understanding it; there is no other way,” and secondly, that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The founder of the “science of religion”, Friedrich Max Müller, defines it terms of 
“comprehensiveness” and “exactness”.	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“from the standpoint of the essence of religion [in the religious quest], it is a mistake to ask 
‘what is the purpose of religion for us?’ and one that clearly betrays an attitude of trying to 
understand religion apart from the religious quest.” The important point in what Nishitani is 
saying, is to argue that the very question “what is religion?” has existential and subjective 
prerequisites or conditions to approaching it, and the way in which these prerequisites are 
sought, or at least hinted to, is in another “counter-question” as he calls it: “The 
counterquestion which achieves this breakthrough is one that asks, ‘For what purpose do I 
myself exist?” (Nishitani, p. 2, 1982).  
Whereas the question of religion, as “what is religion?” is underlined by the assumption 
that our self-identity as questioner is entact, Nishitani’s claim, is that “…religion upsets the 
posture from which we think of ourselves as telos and center for all things.” (Nishitani, p. 3, 
1982) In a sense, one can say that religion seeks to make us less subjective (as telos), yet does 
so addressing the subject and the subjective. In so assuming, there becomes another premise 
which is, that only a certain posture allows the question of religion to become a relevant 
question to life itself. 
 
This fundamental conversion in life is occasioned by the opening up of the horizon of nihility at the ground of 
life. It is nothing less than a conversion from the self-centered (or man-centered) mode of being, which always 
asks what use things have for us (or for man), to an attitude that asks for what purpose we ourselves (or man) 
exist. Only when we stand at this turning point does the question ‘what is religion?’ really become our own 
(Nishitani, 4-5, 1982) 
 
In a sense then, the subject of religion, is the “subject” of one’s self-world relation. 
This localization of the essence of religion, is not a final attempt at exposing any essences. It 
is a localization which is itself, a dissemination and diffusion of “locality” and “finality”. The 
subject-world relation is actually nowhere to be found, except in time and becoming.  
 For Nishitani, “the question that asks about reality must itself become something that 
belongs to reality” and accordingly Nishitani attempts to “answer to the question of the 
essence of religion by tracing the process of the real pursuit of true reality.” (Nishitani, p. 6, 
1982) But does Nishitani not put too much emphasis on the relation between religion and so 
called, “true reality”? Despite the Cambridge definition which mentioned the concern of the 
philosophy of religion with “actual existence”, Nishitani deals with reality, expectedly, in a 
very different sense. A sense that will be later joined and further elaborated in the next 
chapter. And as we have reached a point in which the concept of “reality” will play an 
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important part, it will become more obvious why tracing the advent of science and its unique 
form of epistemic authority with regards to “true reality” is extremely relevant here.  
 
1.4 Science and Shifting Epistemic Authority: 
Beginning a discussion of the study of religion with the epistemic parameters set by the 
scientific paradigm is among my initial concerns. The philosopher of science, Daniel C. 
Dennet, contends that “there is no such thing as a philosophy-free science; there is only a 
science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination.” (Dennet, p. 21, 
1995).  
It is significant to remind that prior to the study of religion as “phenomenon”, there was 
no concrete overarching conception of “religion” as such, instead, religion, this or that 
religion, provided a framework from which the world was viewed and other questions asked. 
Today, in at least the academic discourses, religion provides no framework at all, the 
framework is already provided from elsewhere and as such, “religion” is turned from 
framework (in which God/Sacredness/Divinity is an inseparable pole in terms of which 
religion is religion) to object of knowledge, or a “human phenomenon” (which is therefore 
hypothetically understandable with natural laws without recourse to “divinity,” and which 
posits divinity itself as a hypothesis).   
It is very interesting then to ask this question, how does scientific subjective requirements 
and conditions, reconfigure our relationship, not to an unidentified “religion” in itself, 
(secularization), but to the “religious address”—which was (authoritatively) divine, and now 
is hypothetical? How does the hypothetical nature of religion, in an objective framework, 
override the language play of the religious address?  
It is clear that the advent of science has effected a revolution in epistemic authority in 
relation to “reality”. This conversion, often underlined as the foundational impulse and 
framework of modernity, with its unique methodological input, can be seen best in the 
framework of its epistemic and communicative paradigms. Science, I believe, operates on 
and affords some level of certainty (or pragmatic certainty) within a public and language 
based frame of reference, that is, anything that is knowable in or by scientific methods and 
endeavors is hypothetically expressible and knowable by anyone and everyone, and therefore, 
potentially falsifiable. This is quite unlike traditional religious (epistemic) authority, in which 
a hierarchy ensues based on the (embedded) spiritual differences and relations between 
others, in relation to a passed down past, and in relation to a present and given state of affairs. 
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So what about dimensions of “human” existence which are not public, and not even speak-
able, representable? Where does the event of privacy or secrecy occur, and has religion 
anything to do with this private event which the methodological publicity of the scientific 
method is perhaps incapable of discerning as part and parcel of “what religion is”? How does 
one then reach certainty or establishment in the most non-public, non-exposable, non-
demonstrable, and non-communicative self-relational realm of subjective existence?  
As religion constitutes an intersubjective reality, it is therefore governed by 
communicative forms of authority and meaning, and just as much, the intersubjective reality 
that science constitutes must also have its unique forms of communication and authority. 
Assuming that somehow these two types of authorities are in some sort of correlation 
(whether negative or positive), then the tackling of one should be illuminating for the other. If 
the authority envisioned in the epistemology of science can be subsumed under a single 
banner of the Western metaphysical tradition, one could, with much hesitancy involved, 
focus on the notion of “objectivity” and its related communicative/epistemological criteria, 
presuppositions, and methodologies. Even if it is already established that objectivity is not the 
whole of the scientific endeavor, or that science represents a certain degree or definition of 
objectivity that does not exhaust its other more subject-oriented synonyms and requirements, 
(such as “honesty”, “truthfulness”, “pragmatism”), nevertheless it still constitutes its 
philosophical foundation, “what is the object?”  
As the focus is on the epistemic/communicative paradigm that is initiated by the 
scientific approach, the question which arises along this paradigm, is the question of 
epistemic authority, where is “truth” to be located, in which method, in which paradigm, and 
by whom, and how does “language” stand in this relation? The iconic meeting of the Church 
and Galileo, or any of the scientists/mystic figures that could care less about the Church’s 
scriptural/natural deductions, is exemplary in that it is a moment in which a truth controversy 
instigated a rift in the epistemic authority of the Church, which in turn instigated a rift in its 
political and governing authority. What sort of epistemic/communicative shift is being hinted 
at through this historical meeting?  
By bringing an “unobservable” into observation with the newly upgraded telescope, 
Galileo laid open the demonstrative potency of collective (and of course, accumulated) 
confirmation of notions and hypotheses regarding reality polemical to the Church’s positions 
to the same, by virtue of empirical correspondence and consensual validation. The Church, 
in opposition to this empirical epistemic authority made use of its own coercive authority 
(“prescription as coercion”), indeed for socio-political purposes and at that time also by 
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virtue of popular support and consensus, but in the gown of a truth-controversy about the 
nature of the world, not about the nature of the Church or of religion. In this sense, we could 
think of authority (regardless of it being religious, secular, or scientific) as arising when one 
(or many) evidence his/her or their proximity to the real (the true) within a shared or 
sharable system of meaning.  
In any case, however one thinks of it, the important point is that epistemic authority in a 
positivist scientific paradigm is constituted in relation to objective “certainty”, “observation” 
of mind independent entities, and a commitment to accuracy of language and generality of 
claims (Inwagen, 107, 2015). 
By descriptive epistemic authority I mean, that authority which is open to collective 
(consensual) validation by empirical means, and which presumes the primacy of 
correspondent (normative) language. By prescriptive epistemic authority, I mean the kind of 
epistemic authority in which subjective conditions are prerequisite to the access and/or 
relevance of a given “truth”, “knowledge”, or “realization”. Galileo, in this theoretical picture 
then, laid open the possibility of communication, which did not rely on the natural fact of the 
invisibility of the other so cherished by the Church and its already established epistemic 
superiority with regards to the “truth”, but rather, on the other’s responsibility to come in 
public and present a case, on the responsibility that, as Derrida says, consists of the 
“necessity of accounting for one’s words and actions in front of others, of justifying and 
owning up to them.” (Derrida, p. 60, 1995).  
The shift of authority is based fundamentally on a concern with the nature of reality, on 
the relation between reality and Christianity, about discrepancies of verification between 
observations, deductions, and commandments. Fast forwarding slightly into the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries and we find the rapid development of science emphasizing further the 
philosophy and the value of “objectivity” as the sole access point to reality. There are then 
three very tentative criteria I observe in the designation of truth within objective reality and 
the objective methodologies that emerge from it; independence of reality (from the subject), 
correspondence of language (or language as correspondence), and consensus, the 
intersubjective validation that confirms the scholar’s or scientist’s “objectivity”. And it is in 
view of these communicative and epistemic criteria of the scientific approach, that religion 
comes to be seen in the way it is seen, locatable externally to the subject, conceded to by the 
majority (the social), and therefore can be hypothetically understood by correspondence to 
this social manifestation, and its free, legal, individual, and public representatives.   
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 I take seriously the centrality of the self to the entire paper for two reason. Firstly, 
because in our context it is precisely in the parameters of the self that the “address of 
religion” is made, and made comprehensible. Secondly, it is in the parameters of the self that 
the study of religion, and indeed, social and human sciences in general seem to be divided. 
As we saw with Nishitani’s reversal of the question of religion upon the questioner, and as 
we will see in the cases of the phenomenology of religion and postmodernism, that human 
identity (and as such the identity of believer and academic alike) is much more relational and 
variable than to have a monolithic and defined role from which it views its subject-matter 
with secure preplanned certainty (method).  
 
1.5 The case of the Phenomenology of Religion 
 The literal Greek origin of the word phenomenology comes from two words, 
phenomena, which means “appearance”, and “logos” which means logic, word, account, 
intended to point to the giving account of what and how “that which appears, appears to 
consciousness” on a first-person experiential level. Phenomenology was at first of course 
intended to further the rigorousness of methodology by relating it to the fundamental 
constituents of experience, but today, some might associate its practical developments with 
unscientific and subjective intuitions, having, as Sanford Krolick calls it, “a crisis in 
phenomenology’s methodological self-understanding” (Krolick, p. 192).  
 This crisis in the phenomenology of religion can also be traced in 1) the different 
understandings of how the phenomenological method should be applied to the study of 
religion, and 2) the difference between phenomenology in its philosophical sense and its 
(empirical) anthropological sense.  
King, who we find in the introduction/foreward to Nishitani’s book, has a book titled 
Introduction to Religion: A Phenomenological Approach, in which he begins his discussion 
of religion, by presenting a typology of possible approaches to religion. He calls different 
“subject-religion” relations to point to different degrees of “internal-external” approaches.  
The deeply internal standpoint with regards to religion, or in other terms, the 
believer’s standpoint which, if taken in a scholarly fashion becomes theology in the West, 
and the “Teaching”, the “Way”, or the “Truth”, in the East, is quite fittingly “the study of 
religion from within”, and it is this type of study of religion, which is most antagonistic to 
and antagonized by science, as it is the “faith perspective”. Next comes the “study of religion 
from the semi-within”, which King describes as, “the figure of the missionary, who deals 
with other traditions only to pull them ‘within’”. (King, p. 3, 1982). Third comes, the “study 
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of religion from the semi-without”; the semi-without, according to King, is the philosophical 
mode of engagement with religion born out of “the religious sense of wonder and inquiry.” 
However, he poses an important question right after, that is, “where shall one draw the line 
between the religious within or semi-within and the philosophic semi-without? When does a 
theologian-believer who uses all his logical reasons to expand his faith cease to be a 
theologian and begin to become a philosopher?” (King, p. 3, 1982). That is, how can we 
differentiate between “philosophy” that regards religion with a degree of conceptual 
“freedom”, and a philosophy motivated by an “apologetic” intention? Philosophy, after all, 
even by not taking the semi-within position, (which is the one I believe referred to most 
clearly in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy as it is concerned mostly with 
“coherence” and “actual existence”, both of which seem to be born out of justificatory 
(apologetic) or evidentiary concerns), cannot be said to be without. In a sense, philosophy, 
and particularly phenomenological existentialism, gives a considerable degree of attention to 
the realm of personal existence, and as such, are not totally without despite the difference. 
The fourth category of religious studies, according to King, is the one from without, which 
even though is represented in and by some philosophies, “…it is with the social sciences that 
the objective from-without approach to the study of religions has reached its fullest and most 
self-conscious development.” (King, p. 4, 1982).  
But more importantly than the actual typology presented by King, is the reasons for 
which he presents this typology and in specific, as the introduction to his book. “These 
methods of study may be classified in terms of their basic perspectives or positions vis-à-vis 
religion itself. By so classifying them, we shall gain some sense of why the various methods 
operate as they do, of why each produces its own special kind of result, and of what relation 
each has to the others.” (King, p. 1, 1982) In fact, I view the whole of this paper, as a 
reflection on the way in which different methods have to religion, and how religion is viewed 
in each relation. The purpose is not to invalidate a particular approach while proposing 
another, but rather, to reflect on the “contrast” of approaches in relation to a particular 
religious tradition, as a way to think about religion. 
Furthermore, putting King’s comments and observations about the differences of 
“philosophy of religion” between East and West in the framework of his own typology, I 
believe, helps to show how this concern with approaches to religion (as part of the study of 
religion) is perhaps more acute and viewed as more necessary in disciplines that give 
analytical primacy to existential, phenomenological, or more comprehensively for our 
purposes, self-referential registers of meaning and discourse.  
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 A common phrase used in introductions to phenomenology of religion, and of course 
introductions to mystical approaches to life, is the one that is self-reflectively concerned 
about where one should draw the line, whether between the subject-scholar and the object of 
study, or of the actual meaning of religious phenomenon between the singular perspective of 
one’s study and universal ambition of the field.  For instance, King asks why it is considered 
unviable for a believer to perform phenomenology of religion, and that a phenomenology of 
religion can gain much from a believer who succeeds in detaching phenomena from belief. 
Archua Barua in her book Phenomenology of Religion, asks, “Can there be a meaningful 
dialogue between a phenomenologist and a believer?” (Barua, p. 7, 2009).  
Where does one establish such a distinguishing line between one’s relation to religion 
as academic and one’s relation to it as believer/non-believer? Barua continues to consider 
this, “[i]f the believer himself or herself is able to recognize on the basis of the epoche the 
distinction between theology and the phenomenology of religion, one should not restrict the 
scope of phenomenology of religion only to those brands of scholars who are, by nature, non-
believers.” (Barua, p. 7, 2009). It is very interesting to me, that it is somehow taken for 
granted, that the non-believing scholars are more open to receiving or formulating a more 
objective, raw version of the phenomenology of religion, whereas it requires a degree of 
justification and distinction for a believing scholar that his belief is not affecting his 
phenomenology. Sometimes I wonder what conceptual differences it could trigger if, instead 
of dealing with religion as itself a phenomenon, to deal with it as a phenomenology of sorts. 
“In the case of Buddha a deep existential crisis, sparked off by his exposure to the life of 
suffering and to the mysteries of death and suffering, made him a contemplator and a 
phenomenologist.” (Barua, p. 8, 2009). Barua again says “Buddhists for instance, were 
performing phenomenology long before it carried that name.” If in defining 
“phenomenology” and “phenomenology of religion” one can casually connect that with some 
religious groups, precepts, or disciplines, this suggests quite strongly that either there is a bit 
of phenomenology in religion, or that there is a bit of religion in phenomenology, which 
makes their propositioning in relation or connection to each other as “phenomenology of 
religion” understandably unclear.  Where can we locate “religion”, or as Clifford Geertz 
describes the case more elaborately, “[o]ur problem, and it grows worse by the day, is not to 
define religion but to find it.” (Geertz, 1971, p. 1) 
In his article, “Through a Glass Darkly: What is Phenomenology of Religion?”, 
Sanford Krolick notes that “it would be misleading to confuse a mere typology of religious 
institutions with a phenomenology in the philosophical sense, which concentrates on the 
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religious acts and contents in religious experience and explores their essential structures and 
relationships.” (Krolick, 195). So whereas phenomenology has the imprint of experiential 
knowing, or is concerned with “how objectivity is constituted by subjectivity?”, sometimes 
the term seems to mean the descriptive typology of religious phenomenon, or the description 
of religious rituals observed as phenomenon.  
All in all, phenomenology’s proximity to the subject and to the immediacy of 
experience, makes it for me, among the most appropriate approaches to religion, as religion 
itself enjoys the same kind of proximity (address) to the subject and to consciousness as the 
seat of experience. A second reason why phenomenology (and not descriptive typology) is 
important for the study of religion is given by Louis Dupre as Barua explains. There must be 
a phenomenology of religion, according to Dupre, because 
 
 “…the transcendence of the object of religious intention appears within the religious 
experience itself, in its very constitution, and so no responsible or meaningful phenomenology dare 
ignore the degree to which, within the religious act, human symbolic creativity is provoked and 
saturated by an object that transcends it—or to be more precise, by an object that is intended as 
transcendent.” (Barua, p. 50, 2009)  
 
And even though, the phenomenon is that which appears, to look for the traces of the 
transcendent in the realm of immanence, is simultaneously the only possible way in which a 
meaningful conversation about God can be had, and in deed, similar to Ibn ‘Arabi’s own 
approach (Chapter 2), in which the transcendent and the immanent are all the time, two 
polarities of a single bewildering and bewildered reality.  
 The transcendent dimension, is a pedagogic and dialectical one that always, as is 
expected, transcends its representatives. In a word then, “religion” should not be equated with 
the “religious” on the basis of an empirical criterion of certainty and knowledge aimed at a 
particular question. This is the case more generally with postmodernist literature, which for 
some reason happens to resonate with, or even illuminate certain aspects of religion that 
might be self-consciously concerned with language, meaning, and the “subject”, aspects that 
are born out of a conscious “counter-movement”. 
 
1.6 The case of Postmodernism 
Most of us think of scientists as those who really know how things are: they reveal the nature 
of nature; their knowledge of causal laws enables us to produce inventions that make a difference, like 
microchips; their standards of evidence, of verification and general consensus, which ultimately 
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control the paradigms or conceptual frameworks within which they work, are (or should be) the best 
we know (Butler, p. 37, 2002). 
 On the scientific front, postmodernism presents a case of a provokingly critical 
attitude regarding the premises and promises of science, but also enlightenment ideals more 
generally. Jacques Derrida’s work on deconstruction has been seen as a major pillar in 
postmodernist discourse, despite the fact that Derrida himself and some of his commentators 
would object. John Zerzan describes the “content of deconstruction” in Derrida’s philosophy: 
“…to see language as a constantly moving independent force that disallows a stabilizing of 
meaning or definite communication.” (Zerzan, 7-8). Beginning as “a theme within aesthetics” 
postmodernism has spread to “ever wider areas” of our “cultural, philosophical, and political 
experience.” Indeed, the notion that communicating definite and stable meaning is out of 
reach, that the definite relation between thought and language is doubtful in the first place, 
might seem to overturn Enlightenment ideals to the point that Zerzan gives a semi-definition 
of it as “modernism without the hopes and dreams that made modernity bearable.” (Zerzan, 
5). He views postmodernism as some sort of “celebration of impotence”, which “subverts two 
of the over-arching tenets of Enlightenment humanism: the power of language to shape the 
world and the power of consciousness to shape a self.” (Zerzan, 6).  
 Both of these doubts with regards to “language” and “consciousness”—as self-
identity—obviously play into the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of the study of 
religion. Both of these doubts at the root of postmodernism, are deeply connected to the sense 
in which the “human” and therefore, the “free human agent” (the self/subject) are deeply 
exaggerated in Enlightenment discourse. Zerzar writes for instance, “So postmodernism 
reveals that autonomy has largely been a myth and cherished ideals of mastery and will are 
similarly misguided.” (Zerzar, 6). In dispersing the authority of reason and of language to 
form either the world or the self, postmodernism reveals even more significantly, that the 
“subject”, the “self”, to be non-locatable, and unidentifiable.  
 
But if we are promised herewith a new and serious attempt at demystifying authority, 
concealed behind the guises of a bourgeois humanist ‘freedom’, we actually get a dispersal of 
the subject so radical as to render it impotent, even nonexistent, as any kind of agent at all. 
Who or what is left to achieve a liberation, or is that just one more pipe dream? (Zerzar, 6-7) 
 
 On the other hand, supporters of postmodern thought and themes, see in it an 
important and distinctive view of the nature of the self, “which was a challenge to the 
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individualist rationalism, and the emphasis on personal autonomy, of most liberals.” (Butler, 
p. 50, 2002). Despite the “dispelling” effect of postmodern thought, and the loss of any 
anchoring absolute Cartesian point of reference, postmodernism addresses the self and its 
relation to language, in a way that resonates with a need in approaching or thinking about 
religious language, as to create a field in which discussions that are a combination of 
“within-without” perspectives, without definitive certainty in either nor both.  
 However, it does bring into more immediate focus, for each person independently, a 
concern with the “subject” and the “subjective”, not a focus on the unity and self-affirmation 
of reason, autonomy, and homogeneity, but rather, a focus on subjectivity that is other-
affirmative, and which traces the invisible and hidden sources of authority and consciousness. 
 
  Indeed, the term preferred by postmodernists to apply to individuals is not so much ‘self’ as 
‘subject’, because the latter term implicitly draws attention to the ‘subject-ed’ condition of 
persons who are, whether they know it or not, ‘controlled’ (if you are on the left) or 
‘constituted’ (if you are in the middle) by the ideologically motivated discourses of power 
which predominates in the society they inhabit.” (Butler, p. 50, 2002).  
 
 As we will be referring to “self”, “subject”, and “subjective” a lot in the chapters to 
follow, this is a particularly important comment. I do not differentiate strictly between a free 
autonomous “self” and a servant-like “subject”, but whenever “self”/”subject”/”subjective” 
arise in the conversation, what is being hinted at is a discourse of self-reference, even when 
this conversation is devoted to the other. The self, thus, not as an isolated Cartesian ego, but 
the subjected/subjective individual in the relational system, “which is finally that of discourse 
itself.” (Butler, 2002, p. 52).  
But what is the value of this position of “impotence” or more lightly, “incapacity” 
with regards to the definition and scientific value-neutral comprehension of the “phenomenon 
of religion”? The value, in my opinion, is twofold. First, it helps avoiding a direction in 
which we try to “answer the question of religion”, which in turn invites a different way of not 
only “how” to think about religion, but how to think with it. Second, it opens a way in which 
we can say something about religion, and simultaneously, of religion or from it.  
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2. The Rational and the Real in Sufi Literature and Practice 
 
 ﺮﻘﺘﺴﻤﻟاﺍ ﻞﮭﻬﺠﻟاﺍ ﻮھﮪﮬﻫ ﺮﻘﺘﺴﻤﻟاﺍ ﻢﻠﻌﻟاﺍ– يﻱﺮﻔﻨﻟاﺍ  
 
“Fixed knowledge, is fixed Ignorance”—al-Niffari (Niffari, p. 112)2 
 
 
The above quote by the tenth century Sufi mystic, Muhammad ibn Abdi L’Jabbar al 
Niffari, to whom the final chapter is dedicated, is basically the view and ethos of what I argue 
is the epistemic and existential foundation of “religion” which in the most basic terms says, 
no guarantees, nor certainty, as opposed to what is usually attributed to religion, as certain 
belief. I do not want to merely pose this insistence on instability and opposition to objective 
frameworks in order to translate it to a different set of terms and relations, but to try to 
understand the “intentionality” involved in this celebration of incapacity. Why is such 
opposition to rational appropriations and objective methods, strongly stressed in Sufi 
discourse? And how might there be similarities between this opposition and the 
contemporary postmodern celebrations of impotence? 
 Definitions of Sufism are plenty, and within the framework given by King, of 
“within-without” approaches to studying religion/Sufism, one would say, that the definition 
of Sufism appropriated will depend on who is giving it to who, that is, it is part of Sufism’s 
“nature”, to be defined in relation/relative to the questioner.  
We are focused in this chapter on a few aspects of Sufism presented by another, much 
more famous Sufi writer, Muhyi al-Din Ibn ‘Arabi, nevertheless, a rudimentary introduction 
to Sufism in general seems due. Returning to the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy for a 
launching definition, the entry on Sufism defines it concisely, but not entirely as “(from 
Arabic Sufi, ‘mystic’), Islamic mysticism. The Arabic word is tasawwuf. The philosophically 
significant aspects of Sufism are its psychology in its early phase and its epistemology and 
ontology in its later phase.” (Audi, p. 888). I generally appreciate this launching definition 
with its interrelated relevant concerns with psychology, epistemology, and ontology. A 
definition of Sufism that is more attuned to its societal and organizational forms, might not 
stop at “Islamic mysticism”, but further specify the nature of this mysticism on its level of 
manifestation in social organizations, as a hierarchical organizational structure revolving 
around the spiritual center (authority) of the ‘shaykh’ or ‘murshid’ (guide), loosely 
connected through voluntary social associations, (Howell and Bruinessen, 2007).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  From	  Niffari’s	  Mawqif	  of	  the	  Presence	  Chamber	  and	  of	  Letter	  (67:16).	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However, an important comment usually on the mouths of proponents of Sufism and 
Muslim scholars of Islam, has to do with the suffix “-ism” which accompanies much of 
“modern terminology”. Seyyed Hussein Nasr, as well as the British imam and researcher 
Timothy Winter (also known as, Abd El Hakim Murad) both, distinguish the “indigenous 
term” of tasawwuf, in its Arabic resonance, from the English term in one major way. The 
latter is a noun, an entity to which there is identity and belonging, while the former is a verb, 
an act, a performance and a way of orienting oneself within one’s given context, and not to a 
common “Sufism”, but a variety of acts of tasawwuf.  
Weismann writes in “Sufism in the Age of Globalization”, that “The translation of the 
term tasawwuf to Sufism by Western scholars should not be seen merely as an attempt to 
reflect the classical concept; it is actually a reconstruction of its content in the light of modern 
perceptions.” (Weismann, 261). And so, whereas “Sufism” would more generally be a 
discussion of the phenomena outside its “classical conception”, in our context it indicates 
more a performance internal to a religious stance and which contrasts sharply with a 
Salafi/objective stance.  
Along the lines of this ambiguousness of Sufism, we find in the Forward to 
Annemarie Schimmel’s book, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, how her first statement is a 
cautious and absolvent declaration that “[t]o write about Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, is an 
almost impossible task.” (Schimmel, xvii, 1975). This is perhaps due also to the fact that 
Sufism depends in part upon realizing, admitting and affirming a “mystery”, or an (self)-
existence that is always underlined by a lack of knowledge, an alienation that provokes, 
governs, and underlies any “struggle for (the real)”, and which provokes a simultaneous 
“struggle against (the unreal)”. Consequently, we find in Sufism a critical attitude towards 
scholarship or “books” as a value on their own.  
True gnosis, namely the gnosis of the one, is not attained through books, and many a legend tells how a 
Sufi who had reached, or thought he had reached, his goal threw away his books, for: “Books, ye are excellent 
guides, but it is absurd to trouble about a guide after the goal has been reached” (Schimmel, 17, 1975) 
 
 On the other hand, there is also an infinite importance placed on language, on letters, 
and despite the fact that Sufis were critical of the “bookishness of scholars…it is a fact that 
they themselves were among the most productive writers in Islamic history.” (Schimmel, p. 
2) In addition to this, the “Sufis claimed that the whole wisdom was included in the letter alif, 
the first letter of the Alphabet and symbol of God.” (Schimmel, 18). This ambiguity between 
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the critical attitude towards “bookishness of scholars”, to be further explored in this chapter, 
and the centrality of speech acts (such as zikr) and language to the very constitution of being, 
is not only relevant to preserving the meaning of religion from ideological preferences, but 
also deeply relevant to the recognition that, as Geertz puts it, “Worship and analysis are 
simply impossible to carry out together, for the one involves being thoroughly involved, 
caught up, absorbed in one’s experience, in what one is living through, while the other 
involves standing back and, with a certain detachment, looking at it.” (Geertz, p. 108).   
But in any case, one can still discuss main themes in or of Sufism that particularly 
show the centrality and dynamics of “experiential knowing” (existential/phenomenological) 
in relation to ritual practice and hermeneutics, and hopefully as a consequence, get a “closer” 
or more “relevant” conception of religion and religious authority, not in any social context, 
but as an operative concept in the boundaries of the single individual. In Erik S. Ohlander’s 
article titled “Early Sufi Rituals, Beliefs, and Hermeneutics”, he discusses three themes in 
early Sufism and how these themes can be seen as formative of a hermeneutical model of the 
Quran (interpretation by allusion) that is fundamentally contrary or different than the Salafist 
and literalist interpretative traditions/discourses.  
The first theme is that of impatience, or “the insatiable and all-consuming desire to 
know or to experience God in the here and now rather than in the hereafter.” (Ohlander, p. 
56) The theme of impatience, is strongly connected to the source of man’s intellectual and 
spiritual endeavors, and also, the point of psyche to which much of spiritual practice, 
including the Zen “mystifying encounters”, is aimed at taming, while at the same time 
actualizing its potential. A second very important theme in Sufism, is the distinction between 
layers of phenomenal existence, following the binary divine Names of Zahir and Batin: 
 
Evinced in literature belonging to a fairly early period in the history of Sufism, the overarching 
metaphysical orientation of this mythopoesis was one which differentiated between two complementary 
levels of phenomenal existence, namely that which is apparent, plain, outer, and exoteric (Zahir) and that 
which is hidden, obscure, inner, and esoteric (Batin). It is this basic metaphysical binary which has served, 
more so than any other, as a master structuring or framing device within and across diverse levels of act 
and discourse amongst Sufi communities from the formative period forward.” (Ohlander, p. 57).  
 
A third and final theme common in Sufi literature, and closer to our more phenomenological 
concern, arises from the previous idea of a metaphysical distinction in the levels of 
phenomenal existence, and that is, that such layers of “deeper meaning not readily apparent” 
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are nevertheless “conceptually, discursively, and even physically accessible.” The first word 
in the verse that inaugurates the revelation of the Quran is indicative of this; “Read!” or 
“Recite!”—Ikraa’. The theme that arises then, is “a qualitative distinction [very important in 
our context] between rational, discursive knowledge (‘ilm) and its soteriological implications 
and entailments and non-rational, experiential knowledge (ma’rifa) and its mystical 
implications and entailments.” (Ohlander, p. 58). Both of which are seen to be equally 
conducive of unearthing layers of existence that “are not readily apparent”.   
 Such layers of existence however, do not exist in an “extraordinary” or “supernatural” 
realm that is unrelated to the givenness encountered by the “phenomenal self”. It is precisely 
when the mundane givenness of reality that is contrasted with the “extraordinary” becomes 
itself non-ordinary that Sufism, or mysticism, or religion more generally, concerns itself. It is 
when an ordinary occasion all of a sudden carries infinite significance in itself, as itself. 
Sufism is then concerned with perception (Idrak – Arabic) in a more general sense than 
sense-perception, perhaps would be clearer to use perceptivity instead, to mean the more 
general sense of witness/realize. It is rightly a “vocation, discipline, and science” of tuning 
perceptivity to witness to or stand before the non-ordinary, which is after all, quite ordinary 
(Lings, p. 11).  
 Instead of a “vocation, discipline, and science” for the tuning of perception in relation 
to its eternal and unobservable source, Sufism and religion more generally of course, can at 
any time become a vehicle for the closing off of perception. Instead of a “pursuit for the 
real”, it can be a defense against it. So let us assume that there is a hypothetically 
distinguishable mode of Sufi practice, in which the highest pitch of concern is a “pursuit for 
the real” while simultaneously acknowledging other possibilities which are perhaps, 
responses to ailments, rather than a genuinely mobile “pursuit”.  
In any case, the “pursuit” conceived religiously, is not eventually terminated at a 
“conclusion” but is rather an alignment, pursuing an alignment with the real is not a 
concluded pursuit, but a lived one. If it seems to be concluded, or if it needs to be concluded, 
religion and divinity itself would eventually become determined, correspondent, and to prove 
it so, must be “codified” objectively in language and in act, which in turn generates a 
problem and may be a crisis of authority. And while some attempt to defend the 
correspondence of miracles in the Quran to “actual existences”, the miracle of the given and 
ordinary, which far exceeds any retold miracle, is still veiled under this concern of “proving” 
the correspondence is there, or not there.  
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As non-correspondent textual realities, a different dialogue occurs with regards to 
such vexing notions as afterlife, miracles, and omnipotence. For an example, a reverse way of 
viewing the issue of afterlife, is not whether it actually exists, but rather, why it is that human 
consciousness finds it believable and sometimes indeed boring to exist now, as human, on 
Earth, and finds it extraordinary, supernatural, to conceive of its sequel. How is it that the 
idea of a resurgence of individual consciousness is more absurd, from the perspective of 
being alive now, than the existence of individual consciousness already? These questions are 
really provocations for the self and for imagination, taking seriously its own capacity to ask 
and enact any what if situation. The Qur’an often uses this what if language explicitly, such in 
the verse—iza zulzilat al ard zilzalaha--“And if the Earth rumbles” (99:1), inviting the 
reader/reciter/hearer to an imagination of the Earth and the rumbling, in a relational play of 
language; “When (if) the sun is wrapped up. And when (if) the stars fall, dispersing. And 
when (if) the mountains are removed…A soul will then know what it has brought [with it].” 
(81: 1-3…14). The intended provocation of such notions, is even more directly put in this 
manner than I am presenting it, in Surat Ya-Sin,  
 
And he [man] presents for Us a similitude and forgets his [own] creation. He says, “Who will 
give life to bones while they are disintegrated?” 
Say, “He will give them life who produced them the first time; and He is, of each creation, 
Knowing. (36:78-79) 
 
In other words, as if what is being said is, you pose the question without paying 
attention to where and what you already are. Had you paid attention, you’d be just as or even 
more surprised. As Kierkegaard says, “one never reasons in conclusion to existence, but 
reasons in conclusion from existence.” (Kierkegaard, 74, 1999). The Qur’anic response was 
not an “answer” in the usual satisfactory sense, but a “questioning of the question”, a 
bringing back to another question that highlights what already is (the first time) and its 
relation to the “questioner”.  
 
2.1 Sufism in Context:  
The main question I asked myself during my undergraduate study as a philosophy 
student particularly after having been introduced to the “philosophy of religion,” was the 
question of the difference between philosophy and religion. Perhaps, during the period in 
which I was studying Hegel tentatively, that the idea of religion culminating in philosophy 
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both confused and intrigued me. It intrigued me because it posited the idea that there is such a 
“logic” underlying religion, and that if one were to tap into it philosophically, it would be 
revealed, and what was merely belief becomes knowledge, or that belief is merely a step on a 
process-way to something else, to something certain. It confused me, because it posited the 
notion, that it is possible to replace religion with its essential or elementary intention in a 
systematic philosophy and/or science (secularization more or less). I admit, I first enjoyed the 
notion of getting to the same (the divine, the real) without having to pay the same dues 
(debts/dayn) in a “religious” frame. But later on, and without knowing why exactly, I disliked 
the notion that religion should or could be sublated by a “higher” or more objective picture of 
reality, whether through philosophy or science. I took a more interpretative turn towards the 
Islamic valuation of language itself, and the notion that the Quran, as the word of God, is a 
“miracle” and that a “picture” cannot be final, but cyclical in a way. Moreover, I noticed that 
religion, despite its rudimentary presentation in comparison with philosophy and science, was 
pervasive in human interactions on media, in politics, in science, in family, in friendly 
debates.  
There was a sense in which religion had a more performative intention, that it was not 
merely stating how the world is (like science in particular) nor how it should be (like 
philosophy) but, as the Arabic term for religion (din) already indicates, incites and obliges a 
kind of individual and collective path-taking towards reality, or, indebts (yu-din) 
consciousness with a rhythmic (ritualistic) return to the real, as other, and as therefore, the 
unknown or unseen—ghayb, that absence (and transcendence) which extends indefinitely 
beyond the immediate, and returns to it. Perhaps this is why the “theological turn” in French 
phenomenology has a lot to do with the “phenomenology of the unapparent”, and which, 
“reoccurs, mimed and reinvented, through Jacques Derrida and Michel Henry,” (Prusak, p. 
26). Asking and responding in affirmative to the question of whether what distinguishes the 
“theological turn” in phenomenology is “[t]he opening [ouverture] to the invisible, to the 
Other [Autre]…” (Prusak, p. 17).   
 As we have seen with Nishitani and “Eastern philosophy of religion,” there is a sense 
in which “philosophy” needs to be existentialized, that is, to have to do with life itself (with 
the self that questions), and its endeavor is viewed in relation to the “good life” in Socratic 
terms. This explains why even philosophy professors in the Japanese context which King 
discusses, find it complementary if not necessary to existentialize their intellectualism, for as 
King writes, “the ‘real’ world for Zen Buddhism would seem to be the experienced, the lived-
in, the existed-in, context of human life; the philosophic and/or scientific names given to 
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what surrounds us are considered of secondary importance to the religious, that is, fully 
existential life.” (W.L. King in Nishitani’s Religion and Nothingness, xv).  
 From this question of the difference between philosophy and religion comes the 
discussion of difference between the epistemic authorities assumed in both. However, it is a 
difference that as the first chapter has shown, is more clear and comes to full maturity in 
science, and especially visible in “human sciences”. We hinted that the phenomenological 
field of “communication” is where this difference should hypothetically so far be traced. In 
other words, how can the difference in ways of communication between religion and science, 
reveal more about their epistemic assumptions and therefore intentions, in their respective 
discourses? This is more of a reminder question than one to be dealt with now.  
 
2.2 Ibn ‘Arabi: Brief Introduction 
 The centrality and importance of Ibn ‘Arabi’s figure and work within Sufism and the 
more general Islamic public cannot be overstated. He is both the focal target of 
fundamentalist (Salafist) attacks on Sufism, therefore labeled by those al sheikh al akfar (the 
most infidel sheikh), but he also represents the culmination of Sufi philosophy and 
intellectual production, and therefore called by followers or admirers of Sufism, al sheikh al 
akbar (The Greatest Sheikh). In addition to the centrality of his figure and work within 
Islamic history, he is amongst the most researched Sufi thinkers in our contemporary times 
for reasons belonging to what some might call the cosmopolitan nature of his work itself, and 
the more general and contemporary context of theo-political strife in which his works are 
studied. In one of his famous poems, he expresses this cosmopolitan view of religions,   
 
My heart can take on 
any form: 
a meadow for gazelles, 
a cloister for monks, 
For the idols, sacred ground, 
Ka'ba for the circling pilgrim, 
the tables of the Torah, 
the scrolls of the Qur’an.3  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  From Ibn ‘Arabi’s turjuman al ashwaq.	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 Ibn ‘Arabi was born on the twenty-seventh of Ramadan 560 A.H., or the seventh of 
August 1165 A.D. in the town of Murcia in Andalusia (modern day Spain) to an Arab family. 
His full name is Muhammad b. ‘Alī b. Muhammad Ibn al-‘Arabi al-Tā’ī al-Hātimī. He seems 
to have grown up in a strongly religious family, as three of his uncles became followers of 
the Sufi way. From an early age, Ibn ‘Arabi accompanied Sufi masters of which he gives 
account in his writings, but had not joined the Sufi way formally until the age of twenty. He 
travelled from Spain towards the East, and in Mecca was inspired to write his Magnum Opus 
al-Futuhat al Makkeyya (The Meccan Openings/Revelations) which is composed of 570 
chapters, all of them “revealed” to Ibn ‘Arabi by a Divine self-disclosure or revelation 
according to him. From 1223 A.D. until his death in 1240 A.D. Ibn ‘Arabi settled in 
Damascus where he finished working on the Meccan Revelations, his Diwan, and during that 
time also wrote The Bezels of Wisdom “as the synopsis of his teachings” (Austin, p. 11, 
1980).   
As for his style of writing, we could mention here a connection or a similitude 
between Ibn ‘Arabi’s intention in writing, and others like Nietzsche, Derrida, or the Zen 
Buddhist Koans with their mystifying intention. Kierkegaard’s writing was described by 
Roger Pool in his book Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication as follows: “Kierkegaard 
writes text after text whose aim is not to state a truth, not to clarify an issue, not to propose a 
definite doctrine, not to offer some meaning that could be directly appropriated.” (Evans, p. 
154).  Kierkegaard always talks of “my reader” and associates his reader with the Single 
Individual, a concept that is at the heart of his epistemology. C. Stephan Evans goes on to 
explain that “Kierkegaard cannot offer us objective truth because he is seen as committed to a 
view of language and meaning similar to that of Derrida and Lacan.” (Evans, p. 154). A view 
of language that is unstable and unarrestable in concrete correspondences. Not in a similar 
way, but out of a similar view and intention, Ibn ‘Arabi’s (and for that matter, Niffari’s) 
writings and ideas, can have the same description applied to them. Sa’diyya al-Shaikh notes 
that in Sufi epistemology there are “layers of meaning […] always present in seemingly fixed 
phenomena”, and that therefore “knowledge is recognized as being infinitely layered and 
expansive—it reveals more or less of itself depending on the state of the seeker”. She 
concludes that a “Sufi epistemology is theoretically more open to the ways in which truth 
claims are constantly shifting and are often reconstituted at different levels.” Consequently, 
“Sufi methodology recognizes that language mediates between mystical truth and transient 
social realities and that such a mediatory process is inevitably dynamic and fluid.” (Shaikh, p. 
115, 2012). And like Kierkegaard’s use of paradox and irony, Ibn ‘Arabi’s “use of paradoxes 
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might be seen as intentional—a clever, useful, and affirmative means of luring the reader into 
dismantling given assumptions and categories.” (Al-Shaikh, p. 115, 2012). Chodkiewicz 
notes in the introduction to Ibn ‘Arabi’s Futuhat Makkeya, Meccan Revelations, that “[Ibn 
‘Arabi’s] writings, for all their initial difficulty, are carefully designed to awaken the 
particular spiritual insights and meanings accessible to individual readers in their specific 
situation and stage of spiritual development.” (Chodkiewicz, p. 11).  
 
Eventually, as each reader becomes more familiar with the actual existential referents—the 
‘reality’ (haqa’iq)—underlying Ibn ‘Arabi’s ontological and cosmological discussions, it will 
become clear that those discussions are also equally phenomenological descriptions of the 
stages and settings of the larger process of realization.” (Morris, in Ibn ‘Arabi, 1988, p. 13) 
 
 R.W.J. Austin notes in the section titled “His Thought” how Ibn ‘Arabi “combines the 
scholastic expertise of Ghazali with the poetic imagery of Ibn al-Farid, the metaphysical 
daring of al-Hallaj with the stringent orthodoxy of al-Muhasibi, the abstract categories of the 
Neoplatonists with the dramatic imagination of Rumi, and the abstruse science of the 
Kabbalist with the practical wisdom of the spiritual guide.” (Ibn ‘Arabi, 1980, p. 24). As 
such, Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought is not easily discernable, he shifts between discursive modes, in 
the same way or for the same reason that Kierkegaard shifts between pseudonyms, in order to 
address a reality irreducible to any mode alone. In relation to modern philosophy, the article 
introduces Ibn ‘Arabi as “the greatest of Muslim philosophers, provided we understand 
philosophy in the broad, modern sense and not simply as the discipline of falsafa,… (Chittick, 
web) Elsewhere, in the section on Ibn ‘Arabi’s “methodology”, it is noted that Sadr al-din 
Qunawi (one of Ibn ‘Arabi’s earliest and most prominent students), “differentiates Ibn 
‘Arabi’s position from that of falsafa and scholastic theology (Kalam) by calling it mashrab 
al-tahqiq, “the school of realization”: 
 
Tahqîq is indeed the cornerstone of Ibn ‘Arabî's vast corpus, so it is important to have a sense 
of what it means. The word is derived from the same root as haqq and haqîqa, key terms in all 
the sciences. Haqq means true, real, right, worthy, and appropriate (in modern times, it is used 
to speak of human “rights”); haqîqa means reality and truth. 
 
 One of the main themes in Ibn ‘Arabi, and which predominates over the other themes, 
is that of Oneness of Being, or Wahdat al Wujud. This coinage, is a concise and multifaceted 
one, but which is nevertheless not coined by Ibn ‘Arabi and never expressed by him in that 
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way. According to the Stanford encyclopedia, the term wujud for Ibn ‘Arabi carries a specific 
significance in his tawhidic philosophy (philosophy of unity). The concept of wahdat al 
wujud is closely connected to other concepts in the history and development of Sufism 
onwards, such as Oneness of Perception, “having regard to a very important tension in human 
experience between perception and being, subject and object, the knower and the object of 
knowledge.” (Ibn ‘Arabi, 1980, p. 26). However, Ibn ‘Arabi’s use of the term wujud, “did not 
intend to make any distinction but, by choosing the word wujud, to convey the meaning of 
the Oneness of both Being and Perception in the perfect and complete union of the one and 
only Reality [al-haqq]. This is because the Arabic word wajada carries both ideas, that of 
being and therefore objectivity, and that of perception and therefore subjectivity, both of 
which he sees as being one in the Reality.” (Ibn ‘Arabi, 1980, p. 26).  
The root for the word wujud, is W-J-D, pronounced wajada, and means “to find”, 
“come across”, “be conscious of”, “enjoy”, “be ecstatic”. The word Wajada indicates 
“finding” in reference to both that which is found, the object (wujud), and he or she who 
finds, the subject (wajid), the finder. Wujud then, indicates the occurrence of Reality in the 
moment of existence/perception. It is perhaps an addition, but two other derivatives from the 
same root, particularly relevant to Sufism, are first, the word wijdan, which has no English 
equivalent and expresses “affectivity” or rather, the “affective body”, the focal receiver of 
affect in the human being. That which is received, by or in one’s wijdan, is an affect. The 
second term, stemming from the same root, is wajd, which expresses one of the eleven or so 
synonyms or degrees of love in Arabic, and is a love that is all-consuming, existential, and 
intellectual. In other words, the term wujud is used to designate “existence” because “what 
exists is what is found and experienced.” (Chittick, web). The quality and “location” of this 
finding and this experience is pointed to in the other two terms presented; wijdan, wajd, the 
mediators and functions of that which is found (reality/existence), and that which does the 
finding (consciousness/perception). 
Existence, for Ibn ‘Arabi then, is a moment in the life of the cosmos, mediated by the 
human function, represented by and for Ibn ‘Arabi in the prophet Adam, who is described in 
his first chapter as, the only being whom God has “unite[d] the polarity of qualities in…” 
(Ibn ‘Arabi, 1980, p. 56), that is to say, the only being who “shares in the Self-consciousness 
of the Reality.” (Ibn ‘Arabi, 1980, p. 49).  
“The Reality” for Ibn ‘Arabi is an even more important term. Al haqq in Arabic is 
simultaneously the “true, right, real, deserved, proper, and established”. In addition to many 
other derivatives of course, al haqq, is also one of the Divine Names, The Real. While using 
	   30	  
it as a “name”, Ibn ‘Arabi designates certain epistemic and ontological attributes that 
accompany this term, which rejects any determination. In fact, Ibn ‘Arabi defines al haqq as 
“nondelimited being (al wujud al mutlaq)”, and yet, 
 
“[i]t possesses such utter nondelimitation that it is not delimited by nondelimitation. God 
possesses Nondelimited Being, but no delimitation prevents Him from delimitation. On the 
contrary, He possesses all delimitation, so He is nondelimited delimitation” (Chittick, web) 
 
That is, to emphasize the ineffability and indefinability of God or self, is not defining 
him as un-definable, since it is in fact this undefinable being (al wujud al mutlaq) which 
defines, possesses, and is the source of beings (al mawjudat) (Chittick, web). The self, cannot 
grasp itself in the same way it cannot grasp God, and consequently, the more God is defined, 
the narrower the self’s width, response, and transformation. 
 
 …the dynamic methodology of saying and unsaying also suggests a mystical 
pedagogy—apophatic language both reflects and encourages a state of experiential openness 
and dynamism within the aspirant. Michael Sells discusses Ibn ‘Arabi’s al-insan al-Kamil as 
characterized by a state of perpetual transformation (taqallub). This dynamic state 
simultaneously reflects the infinite nature of the real and of the microcosmic al-insan al-
Kamil, never allowing for fixed and static notions of God or self. (Shaikh, 2012, p. 114).  
 
2.3 Sufi Opposition to Rational Thought 
Huwa la Huwa—He not He! 
 In his article, “Clarifying Phenomenologies in the study of religion” Jonathan Tuckett 
quotes Oxby’s criticism of phenomenology of religion, saying “…that there are as many 
‘phenomenologies’ as there are ‘phenomenologists.’ “(Tuckett, p. 75). Coincidentally, or not 
coincidentally, there is a Sufi proverb that states almost the exact same observation with 
regards to “religion”, with one exception, it is not a criticism, “the paths to God, are as many 
as the selves (or breathes) of creatures”—al turuq lilah bi’adad nefous al khala’iq. 
 At the beginning of his article, Ian Almond notes that “over the past fifteen years, 
scholars from departments of comparative religion and theology around the world have been 
rediscovering in their own religious traditions various precedents for Derrida’s 
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deconstructive4 writings, a trend there is certainly every reason to encourage.” He gives 
examples of figures such as Psudo-Dionysius, Meister Eckhart, Samkara, Lao Tzu, and Ayn 
al-Qudat Hamadani, who as he says “have all been credited with deconstructing the rigid 
logocentric assumptions within their own respective faiths, rescuing a more authentic 
spirituality from the legalistic metaphysics of their times.” (Almond, p. 22). Within the Sufi 
tradition, many thinkers can be said to have had a deconstructive stance towards the 
logocentric assumptions of scholars and theologians of their time. The second figure we will 
discuss in the final chapter, is, in my opinion an exaggerated and illuminating example of this 
deconstructive stance, yet not in a public polemic such as Ibn ‘Arabi.  
 The intellectual and theological environment in which Ibn ‘Arabi was writing his 
mystical philosophy, was one divided between two major strands of thought, generally 
designated by Almond as schools of Tanzih (transcendence or incomparability) and schools 
of Tashbih (immanence or comparability). Such questions have been debated for centuries by 
the philosophers of the Kalam and “provided the parameters of a very wide debate…” 
(Almond, p. 26). For Ibn ‘Arabi, ahl al nazar (The People of Reflection) seem to have been 
trapped in an “either/or” binary thinking which he found to be incongruent with the scope and 
simultaneity of the Real. A second and related aspect of Kalam which Ibn ‘Arabi “would 
have resented is its claim to a knowledge of God through reflection and reason (nazar, ‘aql), 
the kind of knowledge that for Sufis could only be obtained through ‘tasting’ and ‘unveiling’ 
(dhawq, kashf).” Almond continues, “In all of these definitions, [of Kalam by Ibn Rushd, al 
Farabi, Ibn Khaldun] a certain theme is constant: the acquisition of divine knowledge in order 
to justify social and legal practices, facilitate hermeneutics, systematize theology, and 
ascertain exactly what is orthodox and what is heresy, (ilhad).” (Almond, p. 26). To 
understand Ibn ‘Arabi’s objection to 1) the binary “either/or” thinking with regards to God 
and self, and 2) the primacy of “reason” in relation to what he calls “divine knowledge”, we 
must look at Ibn ‘Arabi’s characterization of the Real, in relation to which his objections 
make (epistemological, and existential) sense.  
 
2.4 The Real 
 For Ibn ‘Arabi simply put, al-haqq is the name he gives to the unknowable source of 
all effects and actions and which “cannot be described by any of them”. Almond considers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Deconstruction according to Niall Lucy’s Derrida Dictionary, “…begins, as it were, from a refusal of the 
authority of determining power of every ‘is’, or simply from a refusal of authority in general.” (Lucy, 11).	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four of the characteristics that Ibn ‘Arabi associates with the real, namely, incomparability, 
infinity, unrepeatability, and impossibility of the real. These four epistemological 
obstructions that Ibn ‘Arabi gives as reasons against reason, are meant to explain how 
philosophers and theologians restrict the Real for, ultimately, reasons related to 
power/politics/authority, or not too far from it. 
 
2.5 Incomparability 
 
When a person rationally considers God, he creates what he believes in himself 
through his consideration. Hence he considers only a god which he has created 
through his consideration”—Ibn ‘Arabi. 
 
 This quote from al futuhat al Makkeyya, explains what Ibn ‘Arabi means by the “God 
created in belief” or the “God of belief”. This same impulse of highlighting and 
acknowledging only one’s “god which he has created through his consideration”, is for 
instance a common error in the procedures and biases that scientists must also deal with, for 
almost identical reasons and belongs to “subjectivity” in general.  
 
“Chamberlin, in other words, was worried about an all too human tendency—affecting scientists, students, 
and lay people alike—to fall in love with a particular explanation because it ‘feels’ right, and to 
unconsciously engage in one of the most common cognitive biases (and logical fallacies): the selective 
bias towards remembering ‘hits’ (favorable evidence) and forgetting ‘misses’ (unfavourable evidence), 
which, incidentally, is one of the prevalent reasons so many people fall for pseudoscientific notions,….” 
(Pigliucci, pp. 52-53). 
 
 Similarly, for Ibn ‘Arabi the god of belief “changes according to the disposition of the 
believer.” But, regardless of the particularly considered god that each believer attaches to, 
“Ibn ‘Arabi has a generally benign attitude towards such constructs, as long as the believer is 
aware of the ‘actual situation’—that is, the artificiality of his/her God.” (Almond, p. 27). 
However, it is very important to note as does R.W.J. Austin in the introduction Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
Bezels of Wisdom, that “far from being a dismissal of the “god of belief”, illusions and 
imagination for Ibn ‘Arabi are an important part of the reality’s self-realization.” (Ibn ‘Arabi, 
1980, p. 39). Thinkers who Ibn ‘Arabi was responding to, were thus seen as constructing their 
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theologies upon an “empty construct”, one which acquired this aura of authority due to their 
disposition towards their belief. Similarly, Almond notes,  
 
“…just as Derrida sees all metaphysical thinkers as basing their thought systems upon illusory moments of 
‘self-presence’—a ‘center’ that is never really the center, a signifier that can only lead to other signifiers—
Ibn ‘Arabi sees all reflective thinkers as building their ideas about God on something that is not really 
God. In both cases the philosopher falls victim to a certain illusion—the unquestioning conviction that the 
semantic foundation of the thinker’s thought-system (“God”, “experience”, “reality”, “innocence”) is 
somehow sufficient in itself, and requires no further justification.” (Almond, p. 27). 
 
 In this regard, Ibn ‘Arabi is pushing forth the incomparability of the Real (God), over 
against philosophical and theological constructions, that due to their presence within the 
bounds of self, can fall victim to overriding the actual situation; the real situation, and 
become centered and identified with a concept of God. In fact, this danger, in a theological 
sense, is a danger of shirk (idolatry), partnering God with other than God. 
 
2.6 Infinity of the Real  
 In addition, the impossibility of comparing the name of God, to any conceptual or 
theological construct, it is also absurd for Ibn ‘Arabi that in so doing, the “philosophers and 
thinkers have seized upon one or two images and attempted to found their epistemologies on 
them, mistaking them for the Real itself.” This aspect of the real is what I earlier called 
“scope”, that Ibn ‘Arabi claims the theologians and philosophers are reducing. In this sense, 
“all theologies for Ibn ‘Arabi are idolatries (shirk) if they do not take into account the infinite 
range of divine possibilities in addition to their own.” (Almond, p. 27-28) It is this notion of 
“infinity” of the Real that constitutes the second pillar of Ibn ‘Arabi’s objection to positivist 
schools of thought. Although Ibn ‘Arabi has many positive things to say about reason, his 
insistence on the theologian’s ignorance of God’s infinite semantic richness pervades both 
the Fusus al-Hikam and the Futuhat.” (Almond, p. 28).  
 Almond compares this aspect of Ibn ‘Arabi’s discussion of the inifinity of the Real, to 
Derrida’s discussion of the “preface”, and his exploration of “how various thinkers have 
sought to restrict the possibilities to their own interpretations…In Dissemination, Derrida is 
particularly interested in the Hegelian preface—how Hegel sees, and doubts, the Vorwort as a 
way of ensuring that certain unacceptable interpretations of his work will never take place.” 
(Almond, p. 28). Both Ibn ‘Arabi and Derrida then object to the “reduction” of possibilities, 
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albeit, not for the same reasons, a point that Almond feels is important to be made as to 
remain faithful to his caution not to “turn a thirteenth-century Sufi into a postmodern theorist, 
any more than…to ‘Islamize’ Jacques Derrida…” (Almond, p. 22). For Ibn ‘Arabi there is 
what Almond calls a “theological” concept at the root of his objection, and that is, God’s 
inexhaustible divinity, while for Derrida, his objection “stems more from a belief in the 
unarrestable play of forces within the text, rather than any theological concept of its infinite 
unfathomability.” (Almond, p. 28).  
 In any case, Ibn ‘Arabi’s idea of the infinity of Real is directly related to his next 
characterization, and which is according to Almond, “closer to the structure of Derrida’s own 
approach”, namely, the unrepeatability of the Real, (Almond, p. 28).  
 
2.7 Unrepeatability:  
 The fact of the real’s infinite repository of images, is directly correlated to Ibn 
‘Arabi’s third reason for his opposition to reason. It would be counter the notion of infinity, if 
the real had to repeat an occurrence (or an interpretation) which has already occurred, it 
would be, in a sense, in a need to a recycle itself, implying a scarcity or finitude. 
Consequently, for Ibn ‘Arabi the Real, “…in all of its manifestations, never repeats itself. 
[His] main justification of this is the Qur’anic verse “Each day He is upon some new task.” 
(55:29). It is not only Ibn ‘Arabi’s position of course, as he himself quotes Abū Talib al-
Makki saying, “God never discloses Himself in a single form to two individuals, nor in a 
single form twice.” (Almond, p. 29).  
 In this context, philosophy and theology, as long as they are not aware of the actual 
situation, and so long as “reason” constitutes their self-determined certainty, become ways of 
“fossilizing God’s dynamism”. Reason, in the way that is discussed, is the impulse for 
predictability, and control. This becomes even clearer with Ibn ‘Arabi’s etymological 
archaeology of the word for reason, ‘akl:  
 
In the Futuhat, Ibn ‘Arabi points out that the root meaning of the word for reason (‘aql) comes 
from the same root as the word for “fetter” (‘iqal). It is a convenient etymology for the 
Shaykh, whose main objection to the philosophers and theologians is that they narrow and 
limit a “Divine Vastness” (al-tawassu’ al ilahi) that is without attribute or limit.” (Almond, p. 
25) 
 A vastness that is threatened by a certain impulse at “imposing a banality and a 
predictability upon God that Ibn ‘Arabi clearly feels is misplaced.” (Almond, p. 29). And 
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because the real does not repeat Himself in a single form to “two individuals, nor in a single 
form twice”, and because these individuals themselves are part and parcel of the happening of 
that reality, the Real is also simultaneous. 
 For Derrida, the impossibility of repetition “stem directly from the potentially infinite 
number of different contexts in which a text can be read and reread.” (Almond, p. 31). But to 
add more to some of Derrida’s own discussion of origins, centers, and the “Freudian critique 
of self-presence”. In the chapter “Structure, Sign and Play” in his Writing and Difference, he 
discusses what he calls an event in the “history of the concept of structure” (Derrida, 1978, p. 
351).  
 
…it became necessary to think both the law which somehow governed the desire for a center 
in the constitution of structure, and the process of signification which orders the 
displacements and substitutions for this law of central presence—but a central presence which 
has never been itself, has always already been exiled from itself into its own 
substitute…Henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no center, that the 
center could not be thought in the form of a present-being, that the center had no natural site, 
that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite number of 
sign-substitutions came into play, (Derrida 1978, 353-354). 
 
 In this passage, Derrida mentions the “desire for a center” driving the constitution of a 
structure (theological/philosophical/scientific), and how the “center” (God, in religion) is 
revisited and substituted infinitely. A center which is not a “center” but a non-locus, a 
“function”, and in the terms of this paper, a center that is variable and relational, and which 
takes language itself, or “discourse” as the site of the relation to the center (the religious 
experience), and not its map.  
 
This was the moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment 
when, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse—provided we can 
agree on this word—that is to say, a system in which the central signified, the original or 
transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. The 
absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification 
infinitely. (Derrida, 1978, p. 354). 
  
Hence, for Derrida, repetition does not only amount to restricting interpretation, but in 
itself exposes the artificiality of determining “presence” to a center which is a function in a 
system of differences. Another way to translate this into our general theme within Ibn 
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‘Arabi’s terms, that God, as the transcendental signified is intended as such, without being 
determined by the framework of theophany/creation (differences), from which his name 
constitutes an origin that is a relational variable; a name. An origin and a center that is in Ibn 
‘Arabi’s terms a “multiple loci of manifestation”, and which constitutes a framework of 
communication, without assuming a determinable presence to the center of that framework.  
 
2.8 The Impossibility of the Real 
In opposition to the object-oriented logic which posits the “either/or” binary that is 
preliminary to structures and centers, one can posit the impossible simultaneity represented in 
the conjunctive “and”. In the article by Ahmed Achrati titled “Arabic, Qur’anic Speech and 
Postmodern Language. What the Qur’an Simply Says”, he discusses what is called the Wa-
Wa style of discourse, after the Arabic wa, “and”, which Achrati expresses, is “marked by an 
apparent redundancy and disjunction of events…” (Achrati, p. 178).  
 Archarti goes on to discuss how the “and” and the conscious subjective “I” are similar 
in that both are in between. An objective process, one which posits from the start “either/or” 
binary thought, does not assume this mid-position of consciousness as the between; “Located 
between memory and intention, and very much like the wāw, the “I” is the event that adds to 
the layers of past what unfolds in the future.” (Achrati, 197). 
 The “I”, being in that sense like the waw, in the “between” of things like a “link”, 
“synthesis”5 or an “isthmus”, is itself marked by a certain impossibility at self-definition 
being always open-unto the future, being always “neither/nor”. Having itself a (sometimes 
unbearable) dynamism, the “I” can and often does take sides, that is, abandons its 
intermediary realm of the simultaneity of being, and identifies itself, or feels the urge to 
resolve a certain ambiguity by taking recourse in an “either/or” resolution, this perhaps is 
what we call dogmatic or ideological rigidity. In a sense, this principle of the impossibility of 
the Real, or its simultaneous transcendence and immanence, stretches the psyche into a 
tolerance of ambiguity, a psychological and epistemological virtue in the context of the 
“pursuit of reality”, and within science itself.  
But the conjunctivity of the Arabic wāw also conveys a sense of unity and belonging that is 
constitutive of the essence of being … (Achrati, p. 197).  
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 This issue of the impossibility of the Real, elaborates on a point we have talked about 
earlier, namely, the actual situation. With regards to Ibn ‘Arabi’s contemporaneous debates, 
“one pole emphasizes the absolute transcendence (tanzih) of God, the other His immanence, 
but neither have understood the actual situation—that the Real can actually be both at the 
same time.” (Almond, p. 33). The intolerance towards the actual situation of this impossibility 
of the Real, or its impossible simultaneity, is very much related directly to reason, or to the 
impulse which prioritizes rational ordered thought and references, to the exclusion of other 
registers of reality, or “subjectivity”.  
 It is perhaps here that the cryptic formula that was quoted at the beginning of this 
section makes most sense, huwa la huwa, He not He, simultaneously. Everything is Him and 
not Him, more than a statement of truth, this is an epistemological principle, that “anything 
meaningful” as one article on paradox and humor has it, “has a double meaning. This is so 
because no thing is identical with itself” (Murphy, p. 27). Ibn ‘Arabi notes, that those who 
argue for God’s incomparability all to often reference the Qur’anic verse that says “Nothing 
like unto Him” and those who argue for his comparability, reference his many names and 
attributes that are also human attributes. Ibn ‘Arabi then proceeds to argue for his impossible 
position and referencing the same exact verse in its totality, or at least, until its end, “Nothing 
like unto Him, and He is the all-Hearing, the all-Knowing” (42:11).  
 
From a deconstructive angle, Ibn ‘Arabi’s insistence on the simultaneity of everything being 
He/not He (huwa la huwa) is an important step: it acknowledges the illusion of the dualism, 
the fundamental mistake of believing God to be either ‘this’ or ‘that’, transcendent or 
immanent, ‘out there’ or ‘in here’. As long as rational thought conceives of God in terms of 
binary oppositions, ‘opposing the reports brought by the messengers’ in order to establish 
‘true’ knowledge of God, then ‘reflection can only roam in its own specific playing field 
(maydan), which is one of many fields. Because of its committal to simplistic, logocentric law 
of identity (is God X or Y?), reflective thought finds itself a priori unable to grasp the true 
complexity of God. Moreover, in observing how the ‘one who isolates Him tries to regulate 
Him,’ Ibn ‘Arabi seems to anticipate Derrida’s own reasons for his objections to binary 
thought; namely, that whenever two terms are opposed to one another (spirit/flesh, 
nature/culture, speech/writing), a hierarchy always ensues; one half of the term is artificially 
privileged over the other for ultimately ideological purposes.” (Almond, p. 34).  
 
  The question to which this chapter was dedicated is, in what way and for what reasons 
does Sufism, or some thinkers and figures in Sufism’s history, oppose rational binary 
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thinking, and what does this opposition have to say about the nature of the religious 
conception of “reality” and the religious address, as understood and appropriated in Sufi 
literature and discourse? We still have not discussed adequately the “way” this opposition 
takes form in the Sufi practice, which is a point left to a discussion closer to authority and 
communication. However, we did touch upon the reasons why this opposition is stressed, and 
have come to a further elaboration on the different notions of the real underlying religious 
(Sufi) and scientific registers of discourse. In summary, Ibn ‘Arabi’s conception of the Real, 
and the epistemologically related principles with which he attempts to preserve the 
“unknowability of the Real”, namely, incomparability, infinity, unrepeatability, and 
impossibility, begs us to ask, about the practical reasons for emphasizing subjective reality in 
relation to the “religious address” and the question of epistemic authority.  
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3. 
Kierkegaard and Bergson in Context 
 
 Both Kierkegaard and Bergson have their respective contributions to make in our 
context. In part, they provide some of the basis from which the questions of this paper are 
raised, and hence, provide us with relevant concepts and frameworks in which we can discuss 
further what is meant by a priority concern (address) with subjective reality. I first want to 
pick up the theme that ended last chapter, with regards to a conscious and intended 
opposition to reason, its deconstructive gestures, epistemological restrictions, and the driving 
motivation of freeing the real and/or writing, from the “shackles of reason”. The real, in a 
Kierkegaardian sense, that which should be prioritized even above the most universally 
embracing concepts, values, and truths, is the Single Individual as “existence”. 
The single individual constitutes the existential basis of religion as he engages and 
conceives it through Christianity in particular. On the basis of this existential primacy of the 
single individual as the “truth, the real” Kierkegaard’s epistemological assumptions are 
equally variant. His works are themselves published under various pseudonyms, each 
assuming a subjectivity (a stage on life’s way, as one of his books are titled) that constitutes 
the fundamental “subjective position” according to which, there are differences in how 
“truth”, “knowledge”, “reality” and “meaning” are related to, and consequently, to what 
extent these assumptions are inclusive (ontologically relational) or exclusive (ontologically 
independent). The import of Kierkegaard is that religion, in at least one of its senses, is an 
address and discourse, a dialogical drama about and through precisely this subjective mobility 
of inwardness, and as such, subjective mobility itself should hypothetically be assumed and 
accounted for in approaching and studying “religion”, which therefore cannot be “located” 
anywhere satisfactory for observation and comprehensiveness.  
   
3.1 Kierkegaard in Context: 
There are fewer thinkers who have tackled the difference and dynamics between the 
“objective question of religion” or of “objective reflection” with regards to religion, and the 
“subjective question of religion”, than has Kierkegaard. Much the same as with Sufism’s 
distinction between ‘ilm/science and ma’rifa/knowledge (gnosis) the latter necessitating a 
“qualitative/perceptual” and self-referential register of meaning (taste) to be prioritized, 
Kierkegaard constantly refers to “concrete particularity”, to “essential knowing” versus 
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“accidental knowing”, to the non-quantitative or qualitative transition/leap from one sphere 
of existence to another (which is preliminarily absurd, unnecessary, and “opposed to 
reason”), and most importantly with relation to the whole paper, to an ever-
reconstitutable/re-structurable concept of religion, in which the single individual is the main 
actor (above the universal). In fact, Kierkegaard provocatively suggests that “[i]t is impressed 
upon us, in a curiously indirect and satirical way, and even if the lesson goes unheeded, that 
the guidance of science in this matter misguides.” (Kierkegaard, 1846, p. 109). So the 
prioritization of the individual, is not merely a call for individuality to be constituted in law, 
but the implications of the category of “singularity” as constituting individual existence on a 
philosophy of religion, or a religious philosophy. How would the religious address be 
appropriated and viewed, if we posit it in its primary relation to the singularity of 
consciousness, rather than a general or common understanding of “humanity” or the “social 
order”? 
Describing himself as a “religious poet”, that he is a writer who “is nothing of a 
philosopher; he is, poetica et elegnter, an amateur writer who neither writes the System nor 
promises of the System, who neither subscribes to the System nor ascribes anything to it.” 
(Kierkegaard, 1843, p. 34). Seen to be the “father of existentialism”, we find again in 
Kierkegaard the provocative convergence of “religion” with “non-religion”, theists take pride 
in the fact that he is a Christian, while atheists extract the existential “core” from a 
Christianly inspired language. Taking seriously the fact that the source or founder of 
“existentialism”, a philosophy whose main categories are self-referential qualities of 
individual existence (including anxiety, despair, self, irony, inwardness, existential stages, 
absurd, leap, sacrifice, temptation, repetition, trembling, love, duty, objective and subjective 
reflections, essential and accidental knowing, and indirect communication) are inspired 
through a religious life bent on philosophy, suggests already that the existential realm in 
which Kierkegaard reflects on religion and which is addressed primarily by religion, is 
limited to a self-referential register in the life of the Single Individual. By self-referential is 
meant a reflection on religion, not in terms of doctrines, speculation, or history but in terms 
of “movement”, of dynamism, and “stages on life’s way” from the point of view of the 
subjective individual, rather than from the point of view of the “objectivity” or “universality” 
of a theory, science, theology, or philosophy of religion.  
The questions that will hopefully guide this chapter onward, will be regarding 
Kierkegaard’s distinction between different conceptions of “truth” along “objective” and 
“subjective” modes of reflection and communication.  
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Kierkegaard has been received in two main ways, between those who read him as a 
realist, making truth and doctrinal claims, and those who see in him a proto-poststructuralist 
(Hannay, 1998, p. 9). In as much as I am arguing for and from Kierkegaard’s position that 
“the truths of ethics—and indeed those of religion—being directly related as they are to the 
lives of ‘poor existing individuals’, must be continually rethought and reassessed by the 
subjective beings for whom such truths matter” (Dooley, 2001, p. 4), our reading of him will 
be through the latter camp. I believe this illuminates some aspects of Sufism’s “ways” in its 
similarly motivated resistance to the impatience to know or identify, but also helps to 
illuminate the reasons for the theoretical limits of a scientific study of religion.  
 
3.2 Truth for Kierkegaard  
 In contrast to the idea of truth couched in the first chapter; truth of religion as the 
objective correspondence between the theoretical and the empirical or phenomenal, 
Kierkegaard continually argues that, when religion/Christianity is under consideration, and as 
long as it is the interest of the single individual who is seeking his/her own relation to truth, 
the notion of “identity of thought and being” as objective correspondent truth is seen to be 
irrelevant and sometimes even obstructive to what is sought religiously6. Religion being 
bound and absorbed in the actuality of life, renders the identity of thought and being to be 
“…an illusion because when ‘being’ is thought, it is transformed into possibility and one 
‘abstracts’ from its actuality, which is bound up with its concrete particularity.” (Evans, 164). 
In general, for Kierkegaard to “think about some concrete reality is always to apply to it some 
concept and for Kierkegaard a concept is essentially a possibility, a possible way of being.” 
(Evans, 164). He thus constitutes or observes a constitution of polarity in the human being, an 
impasse between the concreteness of an existential life and the abstractness of speculative or 
historical thought, and along the same lines, the concreteness of subjective truth, and the 
abstractness of objective truth. This perhaps resonates with Geertz’s comment that “[w]orship 
and analysis are simply impossible to carry out together,…” (Geertz, 1971, p. 108) 
The different senses of “true/truth” are, like the different senses of the “real/reality” in 
the previous chapter, splintered between different epistemic authorities expressed in 
Kierkegaard in terms of a polarity between “subjective reflection” and “objective reflection”. 
Being a polarity, or a binary, allows Kierkegaard to view his other more existential concerns 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  “Religiously” in English can also carry the meaning of “seriously”, or “scrupulously” (Geddes & 
Grosset, 653).	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of “movement” and “transition” and “stages on life’s way”, in terms of a spectrum of 
possible relations a subject/person can have between these two views and relations of/to 
truth. The relevance of his discussion to our context, lies in the need we have to elaborate on 
the different senses of truth and reality, on the conceptual level of our “subjective” structural 
relation to “truth”, between two different paradigms or registers of language and meaning; 
namely, science (or objectivity more generally), and religion.  
 Kierkegaard declares in an intentionally provocative opposition to his 
contemporaneously general philosophical world, particularly Hegelian philosophy, science, 
and the Church that “truth is subjectivity” (Kierkegaard, 1846). However, “[t]he thesis that 
truth is subjectivity is explicitly said to apply only to a particular kind of truth, the truth that 
is ‘essential’ to human existence, and it is clear enough for Kierkegaard this means moral and 
religious truth, the truth about how human life should be lived.” (Evans, 172). So it is not that 
Kierkegaard does not believe in any objective truth, but rather,  
 
When the question about truth is asked objectively, truth is reflected upon objectively as an object 
to which the knower relates himself. What is reflected upon is not the relation but that what he 
relates himself to is the truth, the true. If only that to which he relates himself is the truth, the true, 
then the subject is in the truth. When the question about truth is asked subjectively, the 
individual’s relation is reflected upon subjectively. If only the how of this relation is in truth, the 
individual is in truth, even if he in this way were to relate himself to untruth.” (Kierkegaard, 1846, 
p. 199). 
 
What Kierkegaard expresses here concerning religion and subjective truth, is 
expressed the same by Eric Fromm with regards to his conception of love, “love is not 
primarily a relationship to a specific person; it is an attitude, an orientation of character 
which determines the relatedness of a person to the world as a whole.” (Fromm, 1956, 
p. 36). In that sense, religion too, and its concern with the reflection on the “individual’s 
relation” is “not primarily a relationship to a specific” divinity or truth but “is an 
attitude, an orientation of character which determines the relatedness of a person to the 
world as a whole.” Perhaps a closer look at Kierkegaard’s critique of “objectivity” in its 
various methodological manifestations (between speculation and historical views) is 
important to understand what Kierkegaard views as the uniquely subjective concern of 
religion/Christianity.   
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In the introduction to his Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard writes, 
 
You may indeed complete a house even if it lacks a bell-pull, but in a scientific structure the 
lack of a conclusion has retroactive power to make the beginning doubtful and hypothetical, 
i.e., unsystematic…[the speculating philosopher] reads and reads, he grasps something, but 
above all he puts his hope in the clarifying reflection that the conclusion will cast over the 
whole.” (Kierkegaard, 1846, p. 15) 
 
 Primarily important of course, is this notion that a systematic philosophy promises that 
“it’s only when the end has been reached that everything will become clear.” (Kierkegaard, 
1846, p. 14). In other words, religion in an objective scientific structure, is invalidated until 
hypothetically the “system” which grasps it is completed. The problem with this is obvious, 
namely, that the first transition from “non-believer to believer” already assumes a “qualitative 
transition” in which uncertainty and incompleteness is part and parcel of the structure or 
rather, movement of belief. Thus, “…to want to quantify oneself into faith along this path is a 
misunderstanding, a delusion, [for fear of succeeding] in transforming faith into something 
else, into another form of certainty, substituting probability and guarantees…” (Kierkegaard, 
1846, p. 13). The delusion according to Kierkegaard, is from a certain attitude or reception of 
what “faith” means, or how it used to be a life-time accomplishment and now taken for 
granted as a given, as a phenomenon perhaps? “The system’s presupposition that faith is 
given dissolves into a conceit into which the system has deluded itself, that it knows what 
faith is.” (Kierkegaard, 1846, p. 16) This is extremely relevant to what we brought up with 
regards to religion as phenomenon or empirical field of inquiry. It is assumed that religion, or 
the question of religion has its response in the “religious”, the empirically associated variables 
of religious forms. However, the religious for Kierkegaard seems to always be self-referential, 
not selfish, but as he says, “…without having understood Christianity, since I merely pose the 
question, I have nevertheless grasped this much, that it wants to make the single individual 
eternally happy, and that it presupposes precisely in the individual himself this infinite interest 
in his blessedness as condition sine qua non; an interest by virtue of which he hates father and 
mother, and doubtless also cares less about speculative systems and world-historical outlines.” 
(Kierkegaard, 1846, p. 17).  
 The first chapter, “the historical view”, is concerned with the view of Christianity as a 
“historical document”. The important task for Kierkegaard in this view would be to “obtain 
completely reliable reports of what the Christian doctrine really is.” (Kierkegaard, 1846, p. 
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21), even if nowadays the focus is not on doctrine but on secularization and/of religious 
authority, the task would still be to trace the reports, trace the empirically viable events that 
shows the changes, movements, and transformations of the religious field. In this sense, and 
here Kierkegaard sounds a lot like some of the quoted Sufi passages from last chapter how 
“[f]aith does not result from straightforward scholarly deliberation, nor does it come 
straightforwardly.” (Kierkegaard, 1846, p. 26). The historical view as he says would result in 
the subject despairing “straight away, because nothing is easier to see than that with regard to 
history the greatest certainty is after all only an approximation, and an approximation is too 
little to base his happiness on…” (Kierkegaard, 1846, p. 21). However, I should note that 
perhaps the audience that Kierkegaard is assuming in his address, what he calls “my reader”, 
is the reader particularly interested in his “eternal happiness” or “eternal truth” and I do not 
read it as a statement about the historical study of religion, only the historical study of religion 
for someone interested in his own relation to religion, or more generally, to the real 
understood as grounded in selfhood.  
 
But looked at in another way (i.e., objectively), the phenomenal is a deception…compared to the 
Hegelian principle, that the external is the internal and the internal the external, it is indeed highly 
original. But it would be even more original not only were the Hegelian axiom admired by our age 
but also had it retroactive power to abolish, in historical reverse, the distinction between the visible 
and the indivisible Church. The invisible Church is no historical phenomenon; it cannot as such be 
observed objectively at all, because it is only in subjectivity.” (Kierkegaard, 1846, p. 47).  
 
In other words, he is not concerned with whether an objective approach to religion has 
its admirable results in its objective way, but that a religious interest, or an individual 
interested in his/her own existence, cannot be satiated by such methods precisely because they 
are objective. Westphal describes Kierkegaard’s conception of faith in these terms, “Faith is 
not merely beyond reason, it is against it.” (Westphal, p. 143). On the other hand, Kierkegaard 
doesn’t seem to suggest that only a Christian in the sense that he understands Christianity can 
have an infinite interest in his own happiness, or be able to realize such an interest, rather he 
explicitly expresses that “only two kinds of persons can know anything about [Christianity], 
those who with an infinite passionate interest in their eternal happiness base this, their 
happiness, in faith, upon their believing relationship to Christianity, and those who with an 
opposite passion (but in passion) reject it—the happy and the unhappy lovers.” (Kierkegaard, 
1846, p. 46).  
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 As for the “speculative view” it has the main “virtue of being without 
presuppositions”, it starts from what is given, and thus the one assumption it makes is that 
Christianity is a given. “It is assumed that we are all Christians…speculative philosophy is 
far too civil…once it was at the risk of life that one dared to profess oneself a Christian, now 
doubting that one is so is something to worry about.” (Kierkegaard, 1846, p. 44). That is, it 
abstracts from the “struggle” that is a concrete and particular process, with a certain kind and 
understanding of “risk”. Another aspect of the speculative view for Kierkegaard is perhaps 
relevant to the ambition of transforming religion into the content of a philosophy or a theory; 
in his words, “converting the whole content of faith into the form of a concept” (Kierkegaard, 
1849, p. 34).   
 
Of course if Christianity is essentially something objective, then the observer too must be 
objective. But if Christianity is essentially subjective, it is a mistake if the observer is objective. 
For with all knowledge where the object of knowledge is the very inwardness of the subjectivity, 
it is also the case that the knower must be in this state. (Kierkegaard, 1846, p. 46-7).  
    
 Since for Kierkegaard Christianity is interested in each single individual’s relation to 
eternal happiness, or the truth about how one should live, it becomes clear why he considers 
objectivity to be a “most unfortunate category” (Kierkegaard, 1846, p. 29) with regards to 
Christianity, for in fact, “Christianity protests against all objectivity; it wants the subject to be 
infinitely concerned with itself.”  (Kierkegaard, 1846, p. 109). It becomes clear why an 
objective reflection with regards to “religion”, as from a religious point of view, cannot 
according to Kierkegaard be relevant to a religiously interested or motivated question: 
 
But for the speculating philosopher the question of his personal eternal happiness just cannot 
arise, for the very reason that his task consists in getting more and more away from himself, 
and becoming objective, thus vanishing from himself and becoming speculation’s 
contemplative power…This can also be expressed as follows: speculative philosophy simply 
prevents the problem from emerging, so its whole answer is only a mystification. 
(Kierkegaard, 1846, p. 49).  
 
 In general, there is a sense one gets from reading Kierkegaard, of a caution not to 
confuse “knowledge” with “faith”, and confusing “objective knowledge” with “subjective 
knowledge” and therefore their related notions of “truth”. he considers that “in such a 
precarious position…much effort, much fear and trembling, will be required if he is not to 
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fall into temptation and confuse knowledge with faith.” (Kierkegaard, 1846, p. 26). And with 
regards to the kind of objective approximation of truth with “proofs”, he asks, “For whose 
sake is the proof furnished? Faith has no need of it, indeed must even consider it its enemy.” 
(Kierkegaard, 1846, p. 27).  
 In a subjective register of truth and meaning, particularly with regards to one’s 
intimate appropriation of the religious address, the discussion can always seem to be too self-
referential. That nothing from outside is allowed to be the concern of everyone, but only me 
myself, is not just a selfish drive, but a responsibility. “The problem concerns only me by 
myself; partly because if properly posed it will concern each in the same way; and partly 
because all the others have faith already as something given, as a trifle they do not even think 
very highly of, or as a trifle that only amounts to something when tricked out of.” 
(Kierkegaard, 1846, p. 18). However, Kierkegaard’s emphasis that the knower cannot know 
absolutely the objective truth of religion or the actuality of existence paints Kierkegaard with 
a Kantian brush that separates the noumenal from the possibility of knowing something 
absolutely. There seems to be a skeptical outlook but as C. Stephan Evans notes, Kierkegaard  
 
…has his own answer to the skeptic, one that emphasizes what might be called the noumenal 
quality of the thinker’s own existence. The existing individual can know himself as actuality 
without transforming that actuality into possibility. The individual subject ‘is able to know 
what lives within him—the only actuality that does not become a possibility by being known 
and is not something that can be known only by being thought.” (Evans, 164). 
 
 He continues to note how this can be interpreted to mean that Kierkegaard is saying 
that the only “thing in-itself” that can be known is the agent’s own reality, and thus that one 
must take a skeptical position about the ‘external world’.” (Evans, 165). The crucial question 
for Kierkegaard then, when it comes to the question of religion, “is not whether a person’s 
beliefs are objectively right but whether the person has the right kind of relationship to what is 
believed.” (Evans, 173). The obvious question this raises, and which is extremely relevant in 
the context of the current Islamic puritanical movements running rampant, is how do we view 
or evaluate the “sincere Nazi” or “sincere ISIS fighter”? Evans emphasizes that “[i]n the end, 
his position is not that what a person believes is unimportant but that how a person believes is 
crucially important.” (Evans, 173). 
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3.3 Essential Knowing, and Reason as Established Order 
Perhaps in the notion of “essential knowing” that Kierkegaard’s differentiation between 
subjectivity and objectivity comes to be clearer as valued in relation to “existence”.  
 
All essential knowing pertains to existence, or only the knowing whose relation to 
existence is essential, is essential knowing. Essentially viewed, the knowing that does not 
inwardly in the reflection of inwardness pertains to existence is accidental knowing, and its 
degree and scope, essentially viewed, are a matter of indifference. That essential knowing is 
essentially related to existence does not, however, signify the above-mentioned abstract 
identity between thinking and being, nor does it signify that the knowledge is objectively 
related to something else as its object, but it means that the knowledge is related to the 
knower, who is essentially an existing person, and that all essential knowing is therefore 
essentially related to existence and to existing. (Dooley, 2001, p. 3) 
 
To return to the premise and theme of resistance to reason, two things can be said. 
First, as Kierkegaard associates reason with what he refers to as the “established order” 
(society, church, mass media) it does not pertain to “essential knowing”, since the 
established order is, according to him, an abstraction from the existing individual. Reason 
for Kierkegaard, is not merely a “truth tracking faculty” in the human, but also a process and 
as such, cannot be directly assimilated without simultaneously becoming a mimesis of a 
pattern already established. Reason, in one of its senses, is the established order and in that 
sense alone, must be opposed for the sake of the existing individual’s singularity, and for the 
sake of preserving the very order opposed. This brings me to the second point to be made 
about this, namely, the teleological suspension which makes sense of this opposition to 
reason, not on its own merit as a dogmatic and irreversible opposition, but a teleological 
one, meaning, a temporary opposition hypothesized to be part and parcel of the growth to 
selfhood, part of an awareness of what Ibn ‘Arabi called earlier the “actual situation”.  
 
3.4 The Single Individual, the Crowd, and teleological suspension  
 There is a common reading of Kierkegaard as a philosopher of isolated subjectivity, 
Mark Dooley notes that “[u]ntil recently, Kierkegaard was appraised as a champion of 
isolated subjectivity, individuality…’objectless subjectivity’” (Dooley, xiii), and 
consequently, that his concern for ethics, politics, and society are overridden by his concern 
for the paradox of faith that the “single individual, though bound by the universal, is higher 
than the universal” (Kierkegaard, 1844, p. 26). In a sense, what Kierkegaard is arguing is 
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that religion is not all about “ethics” nor is ethical existence the highest possible existence for 
a human being. Faith is a separate and paradoxically higher sphere. It is true that Kierkegaard 
views the religious address in an exclusive relation to the single individual, however, it is not 
accurate to conclude from that fact alone that his philosophy doesn’t carry strong political 
and social ramifications. In fact, Mark Dooley’s book The Politics of Exodus: Kierkegaard’s 
Ethics of Responsibility, in his own words “[b]uilds upon the work of these commentators 
[such as Merold Westphal and C. Stephen Evans] by drawing out the ethical and political 
implications of Kierkegaard’s work by coming at his writings from a specifically Derridean 
perspective.” (Dooley, 2001, p. xiii). 
 The political perspective is inseparable from his prioritization of the “single 
individual” as a category of religious thinking, hiding within it a non-deconstructable 
otherness, non-deconstructible in the sense of Kierkegaard’s “doubly reflected” reason7. In 
his book Provocations, in the section titled “The Individual”, he says this of God’s address,  
 
Every call from God is always addressed to one person, the single individual. Precisely in this 
lies the difficulty and the examination, that the one who is called must stand alone, walk 
alone, alone with God. Hence, everything that makes it appearance statistically is not from 
above. If anyone construes this as a call, you can be sure it is from below. (Kierkegaard, 1844, 
p. 313). 
 
And yet, in the introduction to the same book, Charles E. Moore notes that “the single 
individual is decisive in forming community.” (Kierkegaard, 1844, p. 64). This is so, because 
Kierkegaard distinguishes between two concepts of social togetherness or collectivity, that of 
the community and that of the crowd. While the former is a “community of neighbors” in the 
sense of individuals gathered as individuals in an event without dissolving into a collective 
togetherness, the latter is an “abstraction in which one looses himself”, is deeply related to 
“cowardice”, and is not represented by “any one”. He says of it, that in relation to truth, the 
crowd is “untruth”. He also relegates it to nature in a manner that reminds me of Bergson’s 
own approach to be discussed later in this chapter; “Instinctively, ‘man’ has a tactic he uses 
against ‘spirit’: Let us form a crowd!” (Kierkegaard, 2002, p. 243).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  From	  Mark	  Dooley’s	  Politics	  of	  Exodus,	  “…’doubly	  reflect’	  reason.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  reason	  of	  speculative	  philosophy,	  nor	  is	  
it	  enlightened	  reason,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  form	  of	  ethical	  or	  religious	  reason,	  or	  reflection,	  that	  is	  guided	  by	  the	  appeal	  from	  the	  
other	  for	  a	  response	  to	  his	  or	  her	  plight.	  The	  ethics	  of	  responsibility	  does	  not	  give	  up	  on	  reason,	  but	  seeks	  rather	  to	  make	  it	  
more	  liberating	  and	  engaged	  and	  less	  dispassionate	  and	  impartial.”	  (p.	  xxi).	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It is this paradoxical priority of singular relationality to God, the real, the right, the true, 
whether in religious registers or in scientific ones that is necessary, in order to prevent falling 
in the temptation of relating through the abstract established order of the crowd (idolatry), and 
treat it in Kierkegaard’s terms, as a court of last resort in relation to truth. There is, in other 
words, a methodological concern from the side of the subject, with regards to how truth is 
related to, and how it transforms in different situations and caught up by different authorities. 
This concern translates into an almost doctrinal opposition to theology and system-building, 
and redraws religious thinking in the bounds and dynamics of singularity, of consciousness, 
and of relations to others, and to the Real.  
 
The single individual is decisive in forming community. He can at any moment become higher than 
community, specifically, as soon as ‘the others” fall away from the eternal. The cohesiveness of community 
comes from each one’s being a single individual before the eternal. The connectedness of a public, 
however, or rather its disconnectedness, consists of the numerical character of everything. Only the single 
individual guarantees community; the public is a chimera. In community the single individual is a 
microcosm who qualitatively reproduces the cosmos. Community is certainly more than a sum, but yet it is 
truly a sum of ones. The public, on the other hand, is non-sense—a sum of negative ones, of ones who are 
not ones. (Kierkegaard, 1844, p. 241). 
 
 By staying outside the reasonable and established order, or by continually suspending 
it in return to the self, the individual can play the role of reforming, or reconstituting the 
social. Religions themselves have been founded and established by peripheral characters who 
are outsiders to the system. The Quran, in its own words, speaks of the tension between the 
established and the revealed: the command “follow what Allah has sent down”, has been 
expectedly met with resistance from the “crowd”, almost exactly in the Kierkegaardian sense, 
fencing itself with the rationale: “Rather we will follow what we found our forefathers 
practicing. Wasn’t it the case that their ancestors didn’t understand a thing and were void of 
guidance.” (2:170). And for Kierkegaard, his “ethical exemplars (Socrates, Abraham, and the 
God-man) are outlaws to a degree, on the margins of all established ethical and religious 
paradigms.” (Dooley, 2001, p. 5).  
Having the rationale for a suspension of the ethical in the service of what is higher, and 
yet unknown, and also ethical, Dooley writes how  
 
[t]he aim of the teleological suspension of the ethical is to reinforce the fact that our ethical 
codes are ineluctably open to revision, since they are the formulations of existing individuals 
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who are always in the process of becoming, forever subject to the vagaries of time and 
contingency. (Dooley, 2001, p. xviii). 
 
I want to stress, perhaps unnecessarily, that our concern is not the “ethical” 
dimension of religion, nor to formulate or argue in relation to an ethical philosophy, the 
point to be taken is rather, that there is in the “teleological suspension of the 
general/ethical order”, a more epistemological and existential concern which is the one 
relevant to us.  
Approaching Kierkegaard through a Derridean lens, invites Dooley to link 
Kierkegaard’s logic of mobility, contingency, time and becoming, with responsibility 
which as he says, “…requires us to keep both the law and our dominant ethical codes 
open to revision so as to serve the interests of existing individuals and not the reverse.” 
(Dooley, xix). However, the suspension does not amount to a “leveling of the ethical” 
but, a responsibility that is constituted in a “teleological reconfiguration”, (Dooley, 
2001, p. xix).  
 
…[Kierkegaard] might have realized that the one abiding concern throughout is how to 
release the ethical from the sclerosis of dogma so as to keep it focused on what is essential 
and primary in all ethical considerations, that is, the single individual.” (Dooley, 2001, p. xix) 
 
 
 
3.5 The Leap (Knowing not to know)  
 
“Climacus borrows the category of the leap from Lessing, who says that ‘accidental 
historical truths could never become evidence of eternal truths of reason’ and that ‘the 
transition whereby one will build an eternal truth on a historical account is a leap’ (CUP, 79)” 
(Westphal, 2010, p. 134). 
 Kierkegaard’s concept of the leap (understood to be the leap of/to faith) is interwoven 
in our context by now, with a number of other points discussed. The leap, also known as the 
“qualitative transition”, or what I earlier called “movement” and “mobility”, is a subjective 
movement, a resolution to/by a decisive choice, which cannot be quantitatively and 
automatically determined. For an example, he talks about “skepticism” not as a problem of 
logic to be solved, but a “willed standpoint” and “[t]o the degree that skepticism rests on a 
resolution, it can only be ended by a resolution.” (Evans, 164). What does that mean 
	   53	  
epistemologically? That there is a “knowing” that is constituted in “knowing not to know” (as 
Derrida’s chapter subtitle on Kierkegaard’s, Fear and Trembling has it) in the very moment 
of taking a step that (curiously) calls for knowing. He writes in the third chapter of his The 
Gift of Death, titled “Whom To Give To”, that “[e]ven if one thinks one knows what is going 
to happen, the new instant of that happening remains untouched, still inaccessible, in fact 
unlivable.” (Derrida, 54). Fear and trembling themselves are constituents of the leap, they 
define the fact that the leap is always underlined by a non-knowledge, an absurdity from the 
point of view of the subject before springing into the leap.  
 In line with our original contextualizing theme of an intentional provocation and 
opposition to reason, to objectivity, to definition, Ferreira notes that Kierkegaard tells us first 
about the leap in the context of what we can call the “folly of proving God’s existence”, and 
there “it is tied to the concept of letting go. Climacus highlights the limits of demonstration 
when he remarks that what passes for demonstration is usually only a case of developing ‘the 
definition of a concept’.” (Ferreira, 209).  
 The leap, as a concept expresses the contrast between existential transitions between 
subjective and objective requirements. Objectively, in the language of Kierkegaard, the 
transitioning is quantitatively dialectical, follows the immanent spirit of reason and is 
characteristically “direct and immediate”. Direct and immediate refers to “the cumulative, 
automatic, Hegelian type of transition in which something passively ‘flops over’ by 
‘immanental necessity’” (Ferreira, 210). On the other hand, his concept of a “qualitative 
dialectics”, involves a “meta-basis eis allo genos (transition from one genus to another)” 
(Ferreira, 207), a “letting go” which is initiated by a “leap” or vice versa. Ferreira comments 
that the leap is “curiously active yet passive” (Ferreira, 210).   
 Moreover, the leap is essentially silent. Derrida relates in his book Abraham’s 
teleological suspension (as a leap to/by faith) to “responsibility”. The responsibility with 
which the individual must deal with the leap to/by faith, is a singular responsibility or in 
Derrida’s terms “absolute responsibility” between the secret subjective individual and God, 
contrasted with the “general responsibility” of the universality of ethics. The importance of 
religion remaining in the parameters of the single individual, as a matter of consciousness, is 
therefore paramount for every individual and every religion.  
 
3.6 Direct and Indirect Communication 
 Along the lines of “essential” and “accidental” knowing, the notion of indirect 
communication in Kierkegaard relies on a similar distinction with regards to “secrecy” or 
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“privacy”. First, he distinguishes between direct and indirect, with relation to “subjective” 
and “objective” thinking, and  the briefly mentioned notion of “double reflection”. Through 
his pseudonym Johannes Climacus, he writes, “ordinary communication, objective thinking, 
has no secrets; only doubly reflected subjective thinking has secrets; that is, all its essential 
content is essentially a secret.” (Turnbull, 13) 
 What Kierkegaard here calls “essentially a secret”, is really not a matter of “keeping” 
a secret but being one. The single individual in the inwardness of a singularly accessible 
phenomenal self, is essentially a secret. This secret, which is the subject, can communicate 
and be communicated only “indirectly”.  
 The prospect of indirect communication is related for us also to the question of 
religious authority. For the form of communication must carry traces of the kind of authority 
religious authority is. “Prescription” as we mentioned before and will discuss in the coming 
chapter, is a communicative qualification, in the sense that it is not the content of the 
prescriptive communication that matters, but the prerequisite movement of the subject, which 
opens up the communication to the self. In other words, the indirection is intended to involve 
the reader/subject/believer in an activity of sorts. A short yet dense example that perhaps 
needs a separate study, is the repeated Qur’anic command to “Say!”. In context of course, 
God tells the Prophet to “say” this or that in response to a certain event or occasion. But the 
“say” is involved in the verse as part of it. The point being, that command of “saying”, the 
“Say!” of the verse, is first an act of reminder of something already known, and second, more 
important than the assimilation of the knowledge in what is said. Even if the knowledge is 
assimilated already, the command “say”, keeps it in a living state, reminded by the saying, 
and reminding to say. 
 Ambiguity as indirect communication then, besides being a kind of communication in 
which the purpose is not merely to say something, but to say something in such a way as to 
elicit a response in or from the listener/reader/subject, (a response can be a silent one). 
Turnbull, in his article on Kierkegaard’s indirect communication and ambiguity, quotes 
Vanessa Rumble’s statement that “if a single characteristic can be cited as central to the 
practice [of indirect communication], it is the communicator’s simultaneous presentation of 
opposing qualities…The text’s artfully sustained ambiguity draws attention to the multiplicity 
of possible readings of a work and the reader’s activity in appropriating it.” (Turnbull, 15). 
Ambiguity in communication, or as a form of communication, can be easily likened or 
compared with Ibn ‘Arabi’s style of writing, and conceptually, to the notion of the 
impossibility of the Real, in which the simultaneous tanzih and tashbih (comparability and 
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transcendence), or in fact, the simultaneity of “anything being ‘He, not He—huwa la huwa”, 
is similarly a restriction of saying something definitively about God, that ambiguity is in fact, 
a necessary condition of realization: “[True] guidance means being guided to bewilderment, 
that he might know that the whole affair [of God] is perplexity, which means perturbation and 
flux, and flux is life.” (Almond, 32).  
 The “simultaneous presentation of opposite qualities” is the point of bewilderment, 
and their resolution is not “either/or” resolution, but a tolerance of ambiguity that, if held to 
its most honest end, resolves itself in “perplexity”. For just this intention, indirect 
communication exists, and for this reason I believe religion, in the specific way received by 
certain types of religiosities, is an indirect form of communication that seeks to guide us to 
bewilderment, not necessarily by shocking us with “miracles” let’s say, but perhaps, and this 
is the argument of the paper, by opposing that faculty or function, which reduces the 
phenomenological freshness of perceptivity to a kind of indifferent and uninspiring perception 
of the same. Religion seeks in its indirect ways, to re-inspire perceptivity by undermining 
what is taken for granted as ordinary.   
 
3.7 Bergson’s Spectrum of Religion(s).  
 In Henry Bergson’s The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, there is a strong 
resemblance to some of Kierkegaard’s intuitions, expressed not so much in Kierkegaard’s 
literary rhetoric and opposition to science, reason, or the public in general, but nevertheless, 
accounting for “opposition to intelligence” in his more objectively accommodating 
philosophy. And like Kierkegaard’s Single Individual, Bergson also thinks about mysticism 
and mystics as borderline figures whose function with regards to society, or the “established 
order” (reason, theology, science, philosophy) can be likened to Kierkegaard’s teleological 
(reconfiguration) suspension. Primarily important in this comparison, is Bergson’s valuation 
of mysticism, his distinction between dynamic and static functions and forms of religion, and 
his understanding of religion in relation to “nature”—the vital impetus, consciousness, and 
motion. 
He criticizes explanations that attempt to account for religion by demonstrating its 
necessity to life: “[a]nd the explanation is the same in psychology as in biology: the existence 
of a function is accounted for, when we have shown how and why it is necessary to life. Now 
novelists and dramatists are certainly not necessities; the myth-making faculty in general 
does not correspond to a vital need.” (Bergson, 1935, p. 166) This in particular reminds me of 
Nishitani’s question of what kind of necessity religion is? Philosophical concepts in general 
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for Bergson, but in our case particularly, philosophies of religion “…are to be judged not by 
their logical coherence, but their power of giving us sympathetic appreciation of different 
shades of experience; they must be ‘supple, mobile, and almost fluid representations, always 
ready to mold themselves on the fleeting forms of intuition.” (Emmet, 232).  
More in line with where we are coming from in Kierkegaard, a general reading of 
Bergson’s text easily connects with some of the points we mentioned from Kierkegaard. For 
instance, he says that “moral life will be rational life”, and yet, “…because we have 
established the rational character of moral conduct, it does not follow that morality has its 
origin or even its foundation in pure reason.” (Bergson, 1935, p. 85). I want to explore in 
more focus some of Bergson’s own ideas and distinctions. In particular, I want to explore his 
“two sources” of morality and religion, the relation between “religion” and “mysticism” in 
this context and in ours, and the place of the “individual” in this relation. Finally, through 
presenting these three elements, I would like to contextualize this paper within Bergson’s 
framework.  
 
3.8 The Two Sources of Morality and Religion: 
 In his book, Bergson makes a distinction between two types of morality and religion, 
“static” and “dynamic”. He spends a lot of time discussing the purpose of static religion with 
regards to “social preservation”, and its method of operation through what he calls the “myth-
making function”. However, along with our context of an opposition to self-determination 
through reason, language, and object-oriented reflection, he writes, 
 
We have been dealing with the first function of religion, that which directly concerns social 
preservation. Now let us come to the other. Once more we shall see it working for the good of 
society, but indirectly, by stimulating and guiding individual activities…We must always 
remember that the sphere of life is essentially that of instinct; that along a certain line of 
evolution instinct has to some extent made room for intelligence; that this may lead to a 
disturbance of life; that nature, in such circumstances, has no other resource than to set up 
intelligence against intelligence. The intellectual representation which thus restores the 
balance to nature’s advantage is of a religious order. (Bergson, 1935, p. 129). 
 
 A clear and obvious difference between the two authors dealt with in this chapter has 
already shown itself, namely, that when we talk about “Life” we are in the “sphere of 
instinct”. I do not think that Kierkegaard would say the same, rather, he would speak of 
“existence and existing” as the sphere of life. However, Kierkegaard is intentionally 
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provoking the “highest pitch of subjectivity” thereby the very concept of “life” would 
probably not be exclusively about instinct, or “instinct” would not be about “biology”, 
viewed subjectively. On the other hand, Bergson is amalgamating several registers, from 
“experience”, “introspection”, and “intuition” (which account for the subjective) to “creative 
evolution”, “natural tendencies”, and “instinct” (which account for the objective).  
 
The occurrence in mystics of just such an [perceptive] experience would then make it possible 
to add something to the results already established, whilst these established results would 
reflect back on to the mystical experience something of their own objectivity. Experience is 
the only source of knowledge. (Bergson, 1935, p. 248). 
 
 What is relevant about Bergson’s distinction between two sources of religion, is first, 
that the primary relation of religion, is not with “man” as such, but with nature, life, 
consciousness, and the elan vital—vital impetus, which through their interaction with 
“matter” (meaning the matter of objective reality), brings it to life in human form. What is 
essential for him then, is not the relation of religion directly to that which is “human”, but 
indirectly addresses the foundation of that form, the vital impetus of life and creative 
evolution, which he has come about “…by following as closely as possible the evidence of 
biology…” (Bergson, 1935, p. 249). This, for me, opens up the question of religion from its 
bracketed situation in the “religious” and breaks the notion that what religion is can be 
deduced from the patterns of its empirically observable power relations, cultural forms, or 
historical transformations. Something about politics is learned, by studying the politics of 
religious discourse, and something about history and something about culture, through 
looking at religion, but as Sanford Krolick says with regards to the phenomenology of 
religion that observes and categorizes “facts”, that “[s]uch an approach merely succeeds in 
offering a rationalization for similarities obtaining between diverse religious objects and 
appearances. It does not really illuminate those essential structures which are the very 
condition for the possibility of the religious mode of being.” (Krolick, 196). It is somehow 
the component of human life (individually, socially, culturally) that dialogically works to 
reconstitute the relation of individualities to this life. Religion in a sense, follows Bergson’s 
description of “life” as, a “reality that is making itself in a reality that is unmaking itself” 
within the individual, the social, the political and the cultural. 
 The other even more important point, is that when intelligence is set up against 
intelligence in order to reconfigure the vitality of intelligence to its natural balance, that such 
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an opposition is from and of the “religious order”. It is a process that is entirely internal to 
“religion”. Hence, separation of the religious spheres from “other” spheres, virtually petrifies 
religion, makes it indifferent, because it is made different and separate. Along the lines of a 
question asked by my first professor of Sufism in the American University in Cairo, “Is 
Sufism a kind of religion, or is religion a kind of Sufism?” Bergson makes the claim that 
“Religion is to mysticism what popularization is to science”, inversing the relationship 
between mysticism and religion with regards to a more fundamental reality from which 
religion emerges. He answers in favor of the idea that “religion is a kind of Sufism”. This 
inversion is first, in relation to the study of religion itself, that the core of a religion is often in 
a counter-tendency to what is usually attributed and empirically prioritized as that “religion”. 
In that sense, a philosophy of religion has more to learn from mysticism than it does from 
static forms of religiosity, unless the philosopher is interested in a historical, social, or 
political dimension, which then can be just as much a historical, social, or political account, 
in association with religion but not of religion. Philosophy of religion should prioritize the 
mystical dimension of religion, precisely because mysticism shares Bergson’s concern for 
concepts and terms that are “supple, mobile, and almost fluid…”. Second, this point in 
particular explains why I conflate between Sufism, religion, and mysticism throughout the 
paper.  
 Finally, a last input from Bergson relates to the singularity of religious thinking, or of 
thinking about religion with regards to its essence, which is in the single individual. That is 
not to say that the more we understand the “individual” the more “open” forms of religion 
and morality will become more understandable, but to say that the only chance we have of 
comprehending religion, is by relating its address to the individual, who has two registers.  
 
Whichever of these two methods be adopted, in both cases the foundations of human 
nature have been taken into account, whether considered statically in itself or dynamically in 
its origin. The mistake would be to think that moral pressure and moral aspiration find their 
final explanation in social life considered merely as a fact. We are fond of saying that society 
exists, and that hence it inevitably exerts a constraint on its members, and that this constraint 
is obligation. But in the first place, for society to exist at all the individual must bring into it a 
whole group of inborn tendencies; society therefore is not self-explanatory; so we must search 
below the social accretions, get down to Life, of which human societies, as indeed the human 
species altogether, are but manifestations. But this is not going far enough; we must delve 
deeper still if we want to understand, not only how society “constrains” individuals, but again 
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how the individual can step up as a judge and wrest from it a moral transformation. (Bergson, 
1935, p. 100). 
 
Conclusion:  
 Before leaving Kierkegaard and Bergson, let me recuperate the reasons why they 
were relevant to the paper as a whole, and how their terms and approaches help contextualize 
it. Starting with the question of the relation between the question/study of religion and its 
object of study, we decided to bring in Sufism as representing a religious discipline heavily 
focused on the subjective dimension of the religious life. We did so, in order to contrast this 
focus with the academic and objective focus of a “science of religion” and of objectivity. 
Kierkegaard and Bergson provide precisely the kind of thinking about religion that leaves 
open registers of thought and self-reference/exploration that does not wish to determine what 
religion essentially is in definitive language. Despite the fact that Bergson does give a few 
definitions, he does so in relation to a polarity (such as the one Kierkegaard employs) 
between “static” and “dynamic”, and so the definitions are merely relative to these concepts, 
and are themselves orders of nature itself and addresses Life in its depth, not as “man” or 
“human”, but as consciousness. 
 The next chapter, about the text of an obscure Sufi from the ninth century A.D.E 
(second century A.H.), comes in this context in several ways. First, it is an example of what I 
repeatedly called the dialogical relationality of the religious address. Second, it is an 
example of how, in line with Bergson’s inversion, mysticism is the origin of religion and 
religion is the memory of mysticism, simply because mysticism provides a discourse in 
which “supple, mobile, and fluid” language is employed on a religious order, and in relation 
to “religious experience”. Finally, it is an example of a deconstructive Sufi text, and from 
which the notion of “prescription” as the quality of religious authority arose.   
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Al-Nifarri: Against Siwa 
 
“He said to me: The veils that can be communicated, are but a speck of the veils that cannot 
be communicated.” (Nwyia8, 1973, p. 240-1) 
 
For Al-Niffari, as for others in Sufism, there is only two: God who is the Real, and al 
Siwa (Everything other-than-He) the “unreal”. And there are no guarantees as to whether 
one’s actions are in one or the other, one must act in faith. With regards to writing, 
reflection, and science (‘ilm), Niffari recalls God’s command to him, “Neither write nor 
study nor reckon nor examine” (Niffari, mw 34:149, p. 70), because all of these can flip over 
from a concentration on the Real to a dispersion in Siwa, other-than-real. This is so, because 
along the lines of Kierkegaard’s understanding of truth, “something I am willing to live and 
die for”, Niffari writes, “[t]ruth is that which, were the people of heaven and earth to turn 
you from it, you would not be turned: falsehood is that which, were the people of heaven 
and earth to invite you to it, you would not comply” (Niffari, mw 52:2, p. 89). Truth, is not 
in the text, but in the relation held between the text and the reader, and such a relation can 
only be governed by an “infinite concern”.  
So far we have only tentatively mentioned the concept of prescription whenever we 
wanted to make a hypothetical contrast with the epistemic authority that was, also 
hypothetically, relegated to the question of religion appropriated scientifically/objectively. 
We have brought up the concept in the context of “epistemic authority”, and contrasted it 
with correspondent and consensual authority, dictated by the independent object. We have 
also brought it up in the context of ways of communication, and mentioned the ideas of 
advice-command. And finally, we have brought it up in the discussion of the real in our 
rudimentary relationship to it as given, prescribed as a given order. In this one concept, the 
three questions of epistemic authority, existential primacy, and communication are addressed. 
I propose to think of “religious authority” as prescriptive not to justify an institutional 
hierarchical authority into the religious social field, but to realize that whenever a necessity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8In	  most	  cases,	  I	  will	  quote	  Niffari’s	  statement	  directly	  from	  the	  text	  translated	  by	  Arberry	  (1934),	  with	  the	  
rare	  exception	  of	  a	  “mawqif”	  (statement)	  that	  either	  showed	  up	  in	  a	  secondary	  reading,	  and	  which	  reference	  
some	  of	  Niffari’s	  texts	  that	  were	  published	  in	  later	  years	  in	  Paul	  Nwyia’s	  Nusus	  Sufiyya	  Ghayr	  Manshura,	  1973,	  
or	  in	  Saeed	  Ghanemy’s	  Al-­‐Niffari:	  Nusus	  Sufiyya,	  2007.	  Wherever	  the	  latter	  is	  quoted,	  the	  translations	  are	  my	  
own.	  
9I	  will	  use	  “mw”	  to	  indicate	  “mawqif”,	  the	  technical	  term	  for	  one	  of	  Niffari’s	  passages,	  followed	  by	  the	  number	  
of	  the	  mawqif	  from	  which	  an	  address	  is	  made.	  In	  that	  case,	  34	  is	  Mawqif	  (or	  Standing)	  of	  the	  Ineffable,	  and	  the	  
14,	  is	  the	  “address”	  quoted	  above.	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for prescription arises, the religious is there with it, or even more importantly, that 
prescription is a description of the way in which meaning impresses itself upon us, so that 
whenever a need for meaning arises, prescription also arises. Additionally, I want to take the 
aspect of religion that seems most controversial, and examine it rather disinterestedly, 
without accusing nor assuming in it the intention for “coercion” or a sheer desire to “control”, 
and instead to see in it simply an epistemological/existential principle. Examples of 
prescriptive authority outside the “religious” could include treatment programs such as the 
Narcotics Anonymous in which a previous x-addict prescribes for an addict a “program” he 
himself had treaded, or simply “following a course” in a university, prescription and the 
ethics of the religious are there with it to regulate meaning, between individual and course (of 
action). But as this concept itself emerged from a reading of Muhammad ibnAbdiL’Jabbar al-
Niffari’s book, I would like to discuss the aforementioned concept in the framework of this 
much less known Sufi figure, and his text.  
Al Niffari is a discrete Sufi wanderer from the 9th – 10th century A.D. E (3rd-4th 
centuries A.H) whose life, very little is known about, partially due to the fact that he lived in 
the “period of Sufi silence”10 following the brutal killing of al-Hallaj.  
 Jamāl al-Marzuqi relegates the reason for his neglect in the fact that Niffari himself 
did not write about his private life as other Sufis did. “This fact, Marzuki continues, might be 
added to al-Niffari’s errant life, which he spent in travel and solitude while having no 
fellowmen and disciples.” Saeed al-Ghanemy notes also in his introduction to Niffari’s text, 
that “his sincerity with his experience/experiement (tagroba) has obliged him to avoid even 
documenting it” (al-Ghanemy). Others, like Sami al-Yusuf suggested that the reason is that al-
Niffari “committed himself to the principles of taqiyya (dissemination) and takattum 
(secrecy),…” (Qudsi, 409). Chittick on the other hand, explains his reason as follows: “He has 
not received nearly as much attention as he deserves mainly…because of the extreme density 
and obscurity of what he is saying”, or rather, how he is saying what he is saying. (Chittick, 
2008, p. 188). 
In any case, Niffari has left his imprint on Sufism and on the wider culture despite his 
own personal mystery. Some of his passages, such as “the more the vision expands, the 
expression narrows”—Izaittasa’at al ru’yadakat al ebara—(Niffary, mw 28:2, p. 64), has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10An expression used by the Egyptian scholar of Islam, Youssef Zidan, on his 2011 Ramadan 
program, Al-‘Awliya’, (The Awleya – The Saints)—Literally,  “protector, guardian, 
custodian”—implies, a “friend of God”. 	  
	   64	  
become a common saying considered a folkloric proverb whose author is generally unnoticed.  
Qudsi also compares Niffari with Bistami, first in the concept of wuqūf to be discussed later, 
but contrasting his general impression as follows, 
 
What would be seen as a demonstration of the intense emotional experiences of Bistami 
became, in al-Niffari’s work, a result of an intellectual and well-calculated act of writing. 
While Bistami’sshatahat were an expression of living the emotional mystic state, the texts of 
al-Niffari could be seen as a deep study of the mystical state.” (Qudsi, 411) 
 
In Sufism more generally as we have come to see, “bewilderment” is precisely what 
the human is ideally “guided to”. Ibn ‘Arabi had said “know that the whole affair of God, is 
to be guided to bewilderment”. That is, in explicit opposition to the theologians, and I would 
add scientific/objective goal of dispelling the hayra (to answer the question is the goal)and 
that the dispelling of hayra is a sure sign of progress in knowledge.  
 
Sufi language of union would turn on its head the theological sense of hayra, finding in the 
irreducible character of the enigma a key to the language of mystical union. But this 
revalorizing of bewilderment was not an abandonment of theological disputation. In many 
instances Sufi language of mystical union interiorizes within its own movement both sides of 
the argument. (Sells, 1996, p. 96).  
 
The question of religious authority for us in this context, can be seen as the question of 
the meaning of this dialogical interplay between “human agency” and “divine attributes” and 
is not directly a question about social forms of religious authority that arise with it. What 
Mark Chaves calls “religious authority”, and defines as “reference to the supernatural” cannot 
in this context be appropriate for several reasons. First, even without the supernatural being 
referenced and without a particularly religious life, the type of authority that belongs to a 
“religious structure” is still in play, between “human agency and consciousness” and the 
epistemic transcendence of the real, that cannot be reduced to a matter of supernaturalism, if 
that is at all a reduction. Second, “supernatural” seems to express a certain realm of 
communication that exceeds what is conceded to, or what is hypothetically akin to be 
conceded to. Instead of the binary of “natural/supernatural”, we should think of religious 
authority as a matter of our subjective constitution in the limits of singularity, and the degree 
to which subjectivity is able to recognize how the “incapacity to perceive perception is 
perception”, or in Niffari’s terms, veiled by a “near veil” rather than a “far veil”. Niffari 
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writes God’s address to him: “O Servant! Veil yourself from knowledge by knowledge, and 
you will be veiled by a near veil. Do not veil yourself from knowledge by ignorance, lest you 
be veiled by a far veil.” (Chittick, 1996, p. 196).  What counts for a question of authority for 
us, and of religious authority in particular, is not its relation to “nature”, but of the induced 
relation of perception to its own “incapacity”, not as a limitation of autonomy, but as an 
opening to a “double” perception, and a re-configurable self-relation.  
 
4.1 A Note on Translation 
 There is one official translation of all of Niffari’s text, or at least the two main books 
contained therein, “The book of spiritual Stayings” and “The book of spiritual Addresses”. 
Therefore, I will necessarily be referring to this translation, even though, in other sources 
such as Michael Anthony Sells’ Early Islamic Mysticism, where he writes an entire chapter 
on Niffari, translating it instead and I believe more accurately as The Book of Standings—
Kitab al-Mawaqif. An excerpt from Sells’ book gives a brief and accurate, yet not extensive, 
explanation of the word: 
 
The basic radical, w/q/f, yields the primary verb form waqafa (to stand, stop, halt). However, 
Niffari uses the less common causative form of the verb, awqafa, meaning “to make someone 
stand.” He then employs the standard verbal noun waqfa, not in its normal sense as the act of 
standing, but in a causative sense, from the point of view of the one standing, as the act of being 
stood somewhere. (Sells, 1996, p. 282). 
 
 Hence, all of the mawaqif begin with the formulaic phrase, “He stood me in … and 
said to me … “. Arberry’s translation itself is not at all times consistent, owing to 1) the 
untranslatable morphological associations of the Arabic, and 2) because Niffari himself uses 
the terms with different implications at different instances. I will therefore use Arberry’s 
translation as a reference point, but I will not prevent myself from using Sells’ lighter version 
of the same mawqif, nor from translating some of the mawaqif myself if need be. 
 
4.2 On the Style of Kitab al-MawaqifwalMukhatabat. (Book Of Standings and Addresses) 
 
“My recollection is the electest thing I have manifested, and My recollection is a veil.” For this 
recollection is contained in letters, and Niffari “unmasked the idolatry of the letter” (w. 370) at a 
time when Muslim orthodoxy was going more and more by the letter and becoming increasingly 
intellectualized. It was he who spoke of the hijab al-ma’rifa, “the veil of gnosis” (W. 380), which, 
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tender and subtle as it may be, can constitute the greatest barrier between man and God.” 
(Schimmel, 1975, p. 81) 
 
Structurally, Anne-Marie Schimmel references an observation by Pere Nwyia, who views 
Niffari’s whole work to be “…presented as a replica of Muhammad’s experience, a dialogue 
in which man becomes the confidant of God” (Schimmel, 1975, p. 81). It follows the style of 
dialogue present in the Qur’an, which is replete with scenes told through the interplay of the 
“he said—they said” back and forth retelling of a situation--mawqif. Composed of 77 
sections, each of them called mawqif (pl. mawaqif). 
In the previous chapter we mentioned the Qur’anic address of “Say!”, and pointed to 
it as being a “prescription” that is in the context of what we are discussing, even more 
important than what follows it, more important than the content of what is said, which can 
develop and disseminate according to unpredictable historical outlines and contextual 
differentiation. The saying, the say-able, and the unsay-able, converge together in the 
moment of dialogue, “revelation”, and obligation, as a sort of limit and form-ula. Prescription 
therefore implies dialogue and relationality, an implication that is characteristic to 
intersubjective relations, and the Qur’an is replete of stories told in the dialogical form which 
allows each party to speak from within its own subjectivity, as in the following example from 
the story of Moses and Pharaoh, where Moses is in conversation with God: 
 
“Go, both of you, to Pharaoh, verily, he has transgressed all bounds in disbelief and 
disobedience and behaved as an arrogant tyrant. And speak to him kindly, perhaps he may 
accept admonition or fear God.”  
“They said, ‘Our Lord! Verily! We fear lest he should hasten to punish us or lest he 
should transgress all bounds against us.”  
“He said: ‘Fear not, Verily! I am with you both, Hearing and Seeing.” (20:43-45) 
 
Linguistically, Sells makes a point with regards to the relation between the experience 
of “union”11 and “language” so that “…when union becomes the central principle of a 
mystical dialectic, a transreferential aporia or perplexity is built within language, 
transforming its normal functions and structure.” (Sells, 1996, p. 89). In that sense of a 
“transreferential aporia”, it is often the case that the language of the mawqif is against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11Sells relates the notion of “union” in Christian mysticism, to the double notion of fanā’ and baqā’ in 
Sufism.	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language in the very moment it is speaking and addressing itself. Niffari says for instance, 
“Reality as described by letter is a letter, and the path to which letter leads is a letter” 
(Niffari, mw 55:4, p. 92), hence, the “bewildered tongue” and the “apocalyptic moment of 
truth” of which Sells speaks, and by which I basically understand, a non-argumentative 
realization, spoken, despite all possible contradictions in the form of a certainty, a 
prescriptive fact. And this perhaps is the most important point, that “union” or the waqfa in 
Niffari’s terms, “involves not only a passing away of self (nafs) but also a loss of discursive 
reason (‘aql)” or rather a suspension, since reason “functions upon the principle of self-
identity.” (Sells, 1996, p. 93).  
Indeed, the observation which concerns me most, and which does not only 
apply to Niffari’s own text but I would argue on the Qur’an or any religious text more 
generally, is that pronouns (he, they, we, I) as Sells notes, are “apparently” fixed 
identities. Like a mathematical formula, which is written the same way every time 
regardless of the values (identities) or its variables (pronouns), this fixedness is only 
apparent and exists only in the relations between variables. In the Qur’an, when a 
prophet is being asked to evidence or identify the God he alleges to speak on behalf, 
the response is usually “He who created you from a clot” or “The Lord of the heavens 
and the Earth”, or “He who created you the first time”, never dignifying the 
questioners with anything more specific (intentionally and provocatively), and instead, 
identifying the “name” in and through the relation it has with existence, with what 
already is. God’s identity, is a kind of relation that can be abbreviated here as “He 
Who…” for instance, “Created you from a Male and a Female” (49:13). To ask 
therefore about the correspondent reality of God or the name of God, is equivalent to 
removing this pronoun from its relational identity, along with its relevance to that 
which it supposedly relates to.  
The three characteristics of a “formula” (analogically a mathematical formula) 
are indeed relevant to what is being discussed here, namely, a formula is made of 
variables and relations between variables, and once a formula acquires that name, it 
becomes in a sense prescriptive. In relation to the notion of a “play of pronouns”, 
variables are pronouns that assume identities without identifying them, and therefore 
“variability” as a complementary concept to prescription, is the play of pronouns in 
their assumed identities. In the words of Judith Butler, in her introduction to Derrida’s 
Force and Writing,  
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Indeed, we cannot even say, ‘there is an origin’ without attributing an ontological status to 
that which is outside the ontological field within which such claims could be made. This view does 
not imply that origins are simply made up or fabricated, but only that they are instituted, and in 
such a way that involves both an erasure and a deferral of the origin itself. In this sense, we might 
say that the problem of the origin generates linguistic effects always at a remove from that origin. 
(Derrida, 1978, p. xxii. Italics added)  
 
The “play of pronouns” and the “origin” or “reference” of the pronoun, creates 
linguistic effects, because at its bottom one asks, “[b]ut ‘who’ is it who is related to 
‘whom’?” (Sells, 1996, p. 191).  
In a particularly clarifying passage on Niffari’s text Sells writes in his 
“Bewildered Tongues: The Semantics of Mystical Union in Islam”,  
 
The syntax and parallel dialogue structures of the Niffari passage suggest a clear distinction 
between divine and human parties. But the intensity of the experience seems to pull at those 
divisions…The title of the standing, “Who are You and Who Am I,” also gives us cause to wonder 
about the security of a consistent and clear division of the two parties of the dialogue. Could the 
persons be reversed at key moments? … One has the sense that beneath a seemingly consistent and 
clear division, another kind of oscillation occurs, an oscillation not so much of states (union to 
separation) but of references. The “I” that began as the human party seems to flow or overflow, 
momentarily, into the “he” that began as the divine party; the two referential motions run past or 
through one another, as it were. (Sells, 1996, p. 114-115) 
 
On another note, Niffari is far from being an orthodox Muslim, and in some cases is 
viewed to have contradicted some basic tenants of “Islam” through his “shocking statements”. 
Qudsi writes that “It was al-Niffari who wrote on behalf of God: “If you see the fire drop 
yourself in it and do not run away”, perhaps pointing to the notion of crossing the shari’a as 
part of appropriating it, a teleological suspension, or simply as a radical involvement with the 
self. 
 
In another place, al Niffari says that while the wayfarer (al-sä’ir) is proud of his prayers, the prayer 
itself becomes proud of the wāqif. More and more “shocking” statements that refer to the concept of Salāt 
appear in al-Niffari’s texts: “When knowledge calls thee, with all its conditions, at the time of prayer, and 
you answer it, you are separated from Me.” In yet another statement appears an attempt to contradict the 
Islamic idea of the manifold reward granted to him who does one good work by saying that a ‘good work is 
ten to him who sees Me not; but evil (sayyi’a) to him who sees Me.” (Qudsi, 414). 
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 And one of my favorites in this regard, “He stayed me in Culture/Politeness and said 
to me: Your entreating Me, while you do not see Me is an act of worship. Your entreating Me 
while you see Me is an act of derision.” (Niffari, mw 9-1, p. 38). 
 
4.3 Niffari’s Terms 
To begin with, what is a “mawqif” or “waqfa”? We have hinted at its preliminary 
linguistic meanings of “stopping”, “staying”, “standing” in a “situation” or before a situation. 
Ibn ‘Arabi, who has mentioned al-Niffari five times in his futuhat (Arberry, 8), describes the 
waqfa as a midway, a pause of preparation and re-configuration, a certain suspension and 
briefing between two states (hal), stations (maqam), stages (manzil), abodes (munazila), etc. 
subjectively speaking. “Ibn ‘Arabi tells us that this type of unveiling pertains specifically to 
the speech of God from behind a veil—‘It belongs not to any mortal that God should speak to 
him, except by revelation, or from behind a veil.” (Chittick, 2008, p. 183; v. 42:51). Ibn 
‘Arabi calls this “type of unveiling”, a “mutual waystation (munazala)” (Chittick, p. 188).  
Arberry quotes Ibn ‘Arabi’s interpretation of the waqfa in his Futuhat al-Makkiyya as 
follows,  
…the waqif: for as the mystic in his journey is transferred from one station in which he 
has experienced confirmation and presence, to another station for the same purpose, he pauses 
(yaqif) between the two stations, and during this pause (waqfa) emerges from the condition of 
the two stations, learning in this pause the practices (ádáb) proper to the station to which he 
has been transferred. (Arberry, 1934, p. 8).  
 
In the introduction Arberry explains the waqfa with relation to the two other mentioned 
terms ‘ilm (science, knowledge) and ma’rifah (gnosis, and sometimes “knowledge” when 
‘ilm is translated “science”). He writes, “Waqfa has intelligence of every ‘ilm, but no ‘ilm 
has intelligence of it.” (Arberry, 1934, p. 14). And again he says, “Waqfa is beyond farness 
and nearness, ma’rifa is in nearness, and ‘ilm is in farness: waqfa is God’s presence, 
mar’rifah is God’s speech, and ‘ilm is God’s veil.” (Arberry, 1934, p. 14). And perhaps 
closer to the notions and centrality of the “single individual” opposition he writes a page 
after, “The waqif is not approved by the theologians (‘ulama’), nor does he approve of 
them.” (Arberry, 1934, p. 15).   
As for a comparison with Kierkegaard’s distinction between “accidental” and “essential” 
knowing, there is a lot of stayings that touch upon the same, “O Servant! A knowledge in 
which you see Me is the path to Me, and a knowledge in which you do not see Me is the 
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captivating veil,” or again, “O Servant! If knowledge does not expel you from knowledge, 
and if you enter from knowledge only into knowledge, then you are veiled from 
knowledge.” (Chittick, 2002, p. 196). This stance is all too common throughout the text as a 
whole.  
 
A waqf [or waqfa] (“standing” or “staying”) is Niffari’s term for the state of being riveted, 
as it were, in a particular place at the divine presence. The term resonates with the Qur’anic 
“standing” of each person before the revelation of her destiny during the apocalyptic 
moment of truth…In a single ‘standing’ Niffari condenses a full range of language worlds 
and a complexity of referential and antecedental play.” (Sells, 1996, p. 92) 
 
A waqfa is, more than anything, a point along a line. As such, it does not in itself 
have a universal imperative, but can be reduced and deconstructed in another mawqif, 
without regards to it as it were, paying heed only to the new moment, to this waqfa on 
its own terms. It is in this ultimate authority of the standing, over even earlier or other 
standings that seem to say otherwise or straight up contradict each other, that the 
opposition to “reason” or “science” in the general sense of the term as the attempt and 
endeavor to distill universally comprehensible and eternally valid laws, 
reconstructions, or definitions of religion, divinity, or reality as such, makes sense. It is 
opposed not because such a determination is not available (to the individual), but that 
its determination is not available to a consensus, or an object correspondent in 
language, but is rather, language itself. Niffari writes elsewhere, “He said to me, my 
making Myself known to you by means of an expression is a preparation for my 
making Myself known to you without an expression.” (Niffarimw55:16, p. 92-93) 
In other words, the postmodernist discourse and problematization of language, 
reveals that the “statement” will not be able to refine its structure, meaning, 
universality, validity, and demonstration, simply by being discovered or defined 
appropriately, but that in the hypothetical situation where such an elegant proposition 
is set forth, its “truth” remains invisible, hidden behind “veils” in Sufi terminology, 
harboring its own uncertainty principle. These veils are merely subjective, and it is in 
dealing with language in its self, by focusing consciousness on the depth and 
possibilities of meaning in a single repeated word, verse, prayer, ritual, etc., language 
and consciousness are in a game. And it is this language game that gets prevented and 
petrified whenever the search or question of religion is an “objective” one, either a 
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petrification from “within” or “without”. He says of the waqfa, or in the waqfa, “He 
said to me, in staying there is neither establishment, nor annihilation, nor speech, nor 
act, nor knowledge, nor ignorance.” (Niffari, mw 8:15, p. 33). 
 
4.4 Letter.  
In Niffari’s text, “letter” usually stands for language as a whole, and perhaps, for 
language conceived along the legalistic and correspondent logic of nazar (theoretical 
reflection). But it stands also for entities, and beings, for separateness and delimitation. Along 
the lines of modes of knowledge, essential/accidental, and knowledge itself as “degrees of 
connectedness”-‘ilm/ma’rifah/waqfa, and in relation to language, Niffari writes in one of his 
standings, 
 
He stayed (stood) me before Him, and said to me: 
5.   Theory is a letter which only practice modalises; practice is a letter which only 
sincerity modalises; patience is a letter which only resignation modalises. 
 
7.        All other-than-me (siwa) is a letter, and all letter is other-than-me (siwa). 
 
23.      The science whose opposite is ignorance is the science of letter, and the ignorance 
whose opposite is science is the ignorance of letter. Depart from letter, and you will 
possess a science which has no opposite, namely, the lordly; and you will possess an 
ignorance which has no opposite, namely (The real certainty—Al-Yakeen al-‘haqiqi). 
(Niffari, mw 55, p. 92). 
 
 
4.5 Prescription, as an epistemological/existential concept. 
 
He stayed me in Reminding, and said to me: 
1.   You are not established except by obeying the command, and you are not aright except by 
obeying the prohibition. 
2.   If you are not commanded, you incline: if you are not prohibited, you stay. (Niffari, mw 13, p. 
45).  
 
 It is in my reading of Niffari that the concept of “prescription” first took form, 
preliminarily as the notion of formula, which was a description of religion as a whole, 
before the question of authority took more focused attention. His mawqif of 
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“command”, demonstrates the full implications of the concept, as a basis for thinking 
about “religious authority”, but in such a way as to expand both the concept of 
prescription, which is not only religious, and for our purpose, to expand the 
conception of religion, which is not only prescriptive. I have previously brought up the 
term in a tentative contrast with other forms of epistemic authority, peculiar in its 
unique way and purpose, to science in general. I brought it up in contrast to 
“empirical”, “public”, “demonstrative” and “consensual” epistemic authority. I 
brought it up again, as a way of communication (advice-command). And finally, we 
brought it up in the question of existentialism and ontology, where “reality” as such is 
prescribed (given), and where prescription can be viewed, in the words of Kierkegaard 
regarding irony, as an “existence qualification”, or the subjective quality of being-in-
the-world, prescriptively.  
In his article, “Beyond Castaneda and Don Juan”, Henry Bayman refers to a 
conversation between Carlos Castaneda and his teacher Don Juan Matus that can perhaps be a 
perfect representation of the underlying dynamics of “authority” in a religious, and 
particularly Sufi context. He observes a conversation in Journey to Ixtlan, where don Juan 
tells Carlos, “One of us has to change… And you know who” (Castaneda, 1972, p.28).  He 
adds that “[t]his is exactly the nature of the Sufi Master/student relationship.” Going beyond 
the apparently obscure relation between Yaqui Indian Sorcery (presented through the 
controversial works of Castaneda) and Sufism, let us say that this cryptic formula is the 
slogan, as it were, of a relationship or a relatedness in which prescriptive authority is in play: 
One of us has to change…and you know who. Is this not the same conversation that occurs in 
the silent (or not) singularity of the human individual? Can God say the same thing to us, and 
render the “intentionally provocative” nature of the religious address, a playful trickery of 
communication and subjectivity? Is this not the structure of belief itself? More over, isn’t the 
same confronted by scientists in their attempt to dis-cover a truth? Would the experiment or 
the hypothesis speak to the scientist in the same manner, one of us has to change…and you 
know who? Isn’t this guided and guarded by the belief in the validity of the method?  
 In an objective framework, and for its appropriate object-related purposes, prescription 
as a concept related to “religious epistemic authority” presents a problem. The rise of science 
as an integrated method with its epistemic priorities, was partially in response and defiance of 
subjective prescriptive collective authority, by which historically is meant, politico-religious 
authority. In its natural intersubjective and subjective habitat, it is a technical 
epistemological/existential concept and a designation of “religious authority” within that 
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framework. Prescription is also a technical term of the communicative form associated with 
this epistemological framework, or what is the same, the concept of an epistemological 
prescription has implications on the form of communication and language it takes.  
In other words, the “religious authority” that I want to explore as part of the dynamic 
self-relation of each individual, is not necessarily an authority of the other over the self, but of 
otherness as such, or in Derrida’s terms, a self-relation that is open to “the spacing of time” 
(Hägglund, 2008, p. 6), the willingness of the self to follow in an unknown territory, to follow 
prior to knowing, or, to see in the following a hidden demonstration, that is, a subjective 
demonstration. This of course brings up the question of agency and autonomy, does this 
“openness to the authority of the other as unknowability” entail a weakening of autonomy, a 
strengthening of it, or is it irrelevant? I do not intend to go on answering this question in the 
limited scope I have remaining here, but it’s a question I take on board when thinking about 
“prescription”, particularly as it entails the first option. 
 Let us look more closely at the mawqif of command itself, as it appears in the 
text: 
He stayed me in Command, and said to me:  
1-   When I command you, depart unto that wherewith I command you, and await not with it your 
knowledge. If you await with my command the knowledge of my command you disobey my 
command. 
2-   And He said to me: If you execute not my command, except the knowledge of it be made clear 
to you, it is the knowledge of the command you obey, not the command. 
3-   And He said to me: Do you know what it is that stays you from executing my command, when 
you await the knowledge of my command? It is your self, which desires knowledge, so that it 
may be cut off from my will/duty (‘azimaty), and proceed according to its lusts/longings 
(hawaha) in the ways of knowledge. For knowledge has ways, and the ways have defiles, and 
the defiles have exits and highways, and the highways have contrariety. (Niffari, mw 14:1-3, 
p. 47). 
 
The impasse which this mawqif addresses, is that between knowledge and experience, 
knowledge and justice, knowledge and responsibility, knowledge and decision, in short, 
knowledge and God, who says about himself in another mawqif, “Reality is a quality of the 
real, and I am the Real”. (Niffari, mw 4:13, p. 30).  
Elsewhere in the mawqif of the Presence-Chamber and of the Letter, he writes,  
 
He stayed (stood) me in the Presence-chamber, and said to me: 
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18- The most hostile of your enemies only seeks to expel you from ignorance, not from 
knowledge. 
19- If he prevents you from knowledge, he only does so in order to prevent you from 
ignorance. (Niffari, mw: 67, p. 112). 
 
 It is interesting to phrase the situation in these terms, as a difference between 
“dispelling of ignorance” and the “prevention of ignorance”, which imply completely 
different movements. Preventing ignorance, in this case particularly, could mean preventing 
the desire to dispel ignorance, which is unrealistic. However, it is not the prevention of 
ignorance in which one doesn’t know something and acknowledges that fact, but a “double 
ignorance”, in which one is ignorant of being ignorant and therefore, unable to acknowledge a 
fact at all. The command’s dynamic in the mawqif, and the purpose of it being a “command” 
and not merely a plea or a suggestion, is precisely to highlight a provocative and preventive 
imperative, to the stubbornness of the existential fear which underlie the obstruction of 
subjective movement.  
 This mawqif also explains, or demonstrates the dynamics that are supposedly 
simulated or taken in form in the Sufi master-disciple relationship. Al Ghazali, in his E’hya’ 
‘Iloum al-Din, Revitalization of the Sciences of Religion, writes to the disciples of all masters, 
“know that your master’s wrong is more beneficial to you than your own right.” (Gibb, 1953, 
p. 110). Ibn ‘Arabi, in his Divine Governance of the Human Kingdom writes, “The ones who 
know, know by following the prescriptions of the Prophet. Knowledge is only acquired by 
people who love and fear God. If you see such a person…listen to him, agree with him, 
submit to him, even if the things he says surpass your understanding.” (Ibn ‘Arabi, 18).  
I want to prevent the understanding of this kind of authority as “coercion” or a weak 
and unchosen type “submission” to its conception on the level of intention involved in 
“advice” and “demonstration” in a communicative context. In fact, there is a hadith tradition 
that says exactly that—al-din nasi’ha—religion is an advice, and the structure of advice, when 
it is not possible to come to a consensus with regards to the objective validity of the content of 
the advice, is prescriptive. One gives and receives advice, without guarantee of it being 
followed (if one is giving it) or of being valid (if one is receiving it).  
However, this does not mean that religious communication and authority is only 
about command and following of course, but there is a dynamic. A Sufi story, recounts the 
letter exchange between a Master and his disciple, in which the latter asked, “Who should I 
follow after you are gone?” to which the master did not immediately reply, but on a page in 
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a book, he wrote to him, “Follow no one after I am gone”, which the student saw only after 
his Master’s death. So in a sense, prescription is a pedagogic dimension in the religious 
discourse and its type of authority, and for this reason, our fields of concern go back and 
forth between epistemology, existentiality, and communication. Despite Niffari’s strong 
emphasis on the need to follow and obey the command, he writes elsewhere, “when you 
know the knowledge which proceeds from Me, I punish you for following those who know, 
even as I punish you for following those that are ignorant,” and so the idea of following one  
command absolutely (God’s command), actually involves a liberation and emancipation 
from authorities that are beyond or outside of the individual’s self-relation or self-God 
relation, (“the knowledge which proceeds from Me"), and yet not from the individual’s self-
determination, which therefore obliges a pedagogic following of another.  
 
4.6 Authority: 
Our primary question was concerned with the notion of “epistemic authority”, as the 
focal point of a reflection on “philosophy of religion” and its basic question of “what religion 
is”. As the notion of authority is intermingled with a myriad other notions and realities, we 
have contextually defined it, or whoever holds it, as “evidencing one’s proximity to 
truth/reality.” This “evidencing” occurs in the medium of communication, and is the focal 
point of a difference of “epistemologies”, for whereas one “evidences” by “direct 
communication”, the other evidences by “indirect communication”, and the “subjects/objects” 
of concern are of different discursive natures and intentions. That is specifically to say that the 
former epistemic authority is descriptive, while the latter is prescriptive. 
 
4.7 Epistemological implications 
More specifically, I posed the question in terms of epistemological differences 
involved in the discourse of each of science and religion. Why “science and religion”? 
Because, what is meant by “science” here, is not its strictest most successful methods and 
fields, but rather, “science” as a worldview, in which “objectivity” is its highest aim, and in 
which methodologies are bent on reaching it as much as possible. But more importantly, 
because “science” studies religion in such a fashion, and religion objects to its being studied 
by science (“Christianity protests against objectivity" Kierkegaard), we started by assuming a 
contrasting reflection on the epistemological, linguistic, and ontological presuppositions of 
science, with the equivalent (contrasting) presuppositions in the appropriation of the 
Islamic/Qur’anic religious address in Ibn ‘Arabi and Niffari..   
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The epistemological implications I believe are clear. Religiously, or whenever the 
“religious” is brought up in its “essence”, the singularity of consciousness must be considered. 
In turn, this implies that the object of knowledge, is consciousness’s self-relation, as such, 
“knowledge” is here strictly limited to a particular mode of knowing, which although includes 
others and the help of others, can only be appropriated, verified, and “known” singularly. 
Thus, on an epistemological level, prescription breaks with the “independence” of the reality 
in relation to which religion is a “relevant address”. Consequently, as the “independence” is 
negated, and the “self-reference” is affirmed, “language” as essentially part of the subjective 
realm of consciousness and meaning, breaks with the other two criteria; correspondence and 
consensus. It is not therefore, a language that “explains” the world and our existence in it as a 
theory would, from an external viewpoint presented through propositions, but a language that 
relates, reminds, and remembers a moment of subjective opening to reality; a language that is 
always-already in play, communicated by its relevance12, not its correspondence. As such, any 
possible consensus is not due to an undeniable demonstration of an independent fact, truth, 
reality, but a convergence, a meeting, an event. A simple example is the difference between a 
person retelling the rich and vivid events of yesterday to a group which tries to reconstruct it 
mentally, and a group of persons who, despite having different experiences, have “met” in 
yesterday’s event and have the experiential reference of the entire landscape and occurrence. 
Consensus is possible, but more as a “similarity in tastes” based on a shared memory, than an 
irrefutable truth of fact. A consensus in which two agree that a meal tastes particularly good, 
take it on faith that they are sharing the same “taste”, because nevertheless, they are having 
the same experience, sharing the event. Niffari says, “Letter cannot inform of itself: how then 
should it tell of Me?” In that sense, a simple conversation in which two or more agree to the 
particularity of an experience, meet in faith, not in certainty.  
  
4.8 Existential implications 
 In an existential register, the notion of prescription would be extremely related of 
course to the epistemological implications; that is, the fact of its singularity and embodiment. 
Prescription, is indeed life itself, or more specifically, my life, (again, the fact that death is 
always “my death”, is just as true with “life”, which is always my life and which cannot be 
lived by anyone else). I am prescribed to my own existence, in such a bewildering manner, 
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that existence itself seems to be a prescription, following a prescription. Perhaps related to 
God’s blame to Niffari, “it’s your self, it desires knowledge to separate itself from my will” 
(Niffari, mw 14: 3, p. 47), perhaps, the will of God, is in this context, the prescription of 
existing. To clarify, one can perhaps think of the example of suicide in this context of 
“existential prescription” as the utmost degree of negating the prescription, and affirming the 
self’s own, (beyond or through death). Suicide is the real representation of disbelief, and not 
any doctrinal positions or philosophical objections, which in their context of a particular 
religious field, might very well be needed for the sake of the very God and the very religion 
that it objects to. 
After all, the will of God and his prescription, is not only in religions, unless one 
thinks that God is a hypothesis in religion. The will of God and his prescriptions are not in 
language, as the Qur’an says, “We are closer to him than [his] jugular vein” (50:16), in the 
sense that, nature itself is prescriptive. And the whole endeavor of science, in this regard is the 
opposite of “anti-religion” or “anti-God”. Rather, it is to observe, distill, and reconstruct the 
prescriptions (laws) of nature. But scriptural prescriptions are unlike prescriptions distilled by 
science from nature. The former arise from intersubjective relations and their limits 
(commands), but the latter arise from subject-object relations and their limits. Or what is the 
same, the “command/order of subject and subject” and the “command/order of subject and 
object”. But as command, Niffari writes in another interesting mawqif, Mawqif of Tranquility,  
 
“He stayed me in Tranquility, and said to me: It is the experience of Me: it 
establishes what it establishes, and effaces what it effaces.  
And He said to me: It establishes what it establishes of my command, and my 
command enforces what it enforces of my law. My law goes forth with that which issues from 
my theory, and my theory prevails, and I cause you to witness that it prevails. That is my 
tranquility, and you witnessed: and that is my clear evidence.” (Niffari, mw 54:1-2, 1934, p. 
91).  
 
 It is interesting because of the association between the “command of God”, with 
the “laws” that come forth from it, based on a “theory” that causes him who is 
“tranquil” to witness its prevailing, and its “clear evidence”. In any of its registers, 
reality is “given”, and by “given” I don’t mean unchangeable, I mean received on the 
retina of the phenomenal self, as it were, and the implication is that, the more its 
creatednessis affirmed and related to by its relation to “God” (The real unknown), its 
givenness is phenomenologically accentuated. This in turn, is an accentuation of the 
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individual’s relation to the real more directly, more “subjectively”, the command, al-
Amr, is not only “prescriptive” as in “without discussion”, but also in the sense of “state 
of affairs” or “order”, in its double sense of “command” and “form” or “system”, as the 
one found in nature13.  
 
4.9 Communicative implications 
As the phenomenological field in which all of this discussion comes together, making 
clear observations on the way, the how of communication, and the conditions of 
communication in this regard is helpful. We could ask, what would be a notion of 
“prescriptive communication” that is not coercive, “dictatorial”, but which nevertheless, 
acknowledges the subjective limits and their necessities with regards to language? What is the 
impulse behind a communication that demands to “Worship, until the certainty comes” 
(15:99), rather than guarantee the reality of “worship” first? In short, it is to overcome the 
aporia that we formulated as, “one of us has to change, (either the limits of my speaking, or 
your state) and you know who, (since the former is unfeasible!)”.  
Prescriptive communication is a type of “indirect communication” in Kierkegaard’s 
terms, it is a communication that is “subjective”. However, “indirect” here seems 
inappropriate, since the intention in it, is a ‘direct assimilation/appropriation’ by the 
“follower”. Simply put in terms of “taste” again, it is safe to assume that in order to 
communicate to someone the taste of a meal that the latter does not recognize, one will have 
to go through the recipe of preparing that taste (following prescription), and then demand that 
the other tastes for him/herself (prescribing a following). In following a prescription, there is 
obedience, uncertainty, improvisation, in addition to so many other possible responses, 
rejection, disobedience, and disinterestedness. In prescribing a following, there is an advice, a 
suggestion, an order, a demand, and perhaps, from the subjective side, an ordeal. Note, that 
even after the meal is tasted, the taste is still uncommunicated in language, yet communicated 
by the relevance of the experience, itself outside of language and certainty.   
 The two implications of prescription on a communicative level, is as we earlier 
mentioned, “command and following”, which are the movement of prescribing from either the 
giving, or receiving points of view. The notion of command and following, must be 
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  The discussions of the relations between the form or system of nature and the notion of “God” as found 
in Paul Davis’ The mind of God: Science and the Search for Ultimate Meaning 1992 is relevant here. 
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understood, like epistemological and existential limits, to be arising out of limit-case 
communicative scenarios. However, just because they are limit-cases, does not mean these are 
rare cases. In fact, these are everyday cases.  
 From the side of following, once trust is established, “following” follows. That is, 
having faith, is not a matter of an ideological or ontological theory of God’s existence, but a 
preliminarily pragmatic trust (belief) which brings about an openness to “follow” in person. 
But also, in a ritualistic sense, having faith beyond the self. A comment I had received from 
the same professor of Sufism in the American University in Cairo with regards to “prayer” 
and “ritual”, had affected this view when, asking him about the “motivation” to pray 
pragmatically despite not believing in its efficacy and “actual” reward/punishment 
implications as literally true, his only comment was, “the ritual is more important than you.”  
 The ambiguity between trust and mistrust in following a command therefore, speaks of 
the dynamics between “knowledge” and “otherness”, or in other terms, the “seen” and the 
“unseen”, or “predictability” and “l’avenir”— “to-come”, to use a term from Derrida, or 
which is the same in Arabic, mustaqbal (future/or literally, “the (one) coming”), and 
mustaqbil (the host, or the (one) receiving).  
 
4.10 Implications on the Question of Religion 
My experience writing this thesis, was in a way, an experiment in and with its content. 
Having signed up for a philosophy of religion program, I attended the first semester, after 
which I decided to return to Egypt for a month. In this month, I got a chance to be closer to 
the tariqa Burhaniyya in Egypt, and have been attending their gatherings ever since. I took an 
insider’s position, in the sense that I conflated the principles, and allowed oppositions 
between the two programs to converge in me personally. This was partially a 
methodologically conscious decision, to take part in the tariqa process, and to do so in order 
to write from within the process, and simultaneously, to force an expression of this process in 
a language that is perhaps inhospitable to the terms of the experience, academia. In a sense, a 
mutual suspension was in play, on the one hand a faith resisting the objective impulse, by the 
practical involvement in tariqa and its practices despite its aloofness at times, and on the other 
hand an academic writing process resisting the subjective and slippery discourse of belief.  
 Prescription, particularly as I use it here. resists objective communication, in the sense 
of independence, correspondence, and consensus, by emphasizing three contrary principles; 
self-reference, variability, and relationality. A prescription, assumes dialogue, conversation, 
consciousness, where there is more than one “self” involved, where there is the “one” and the 
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“other”. Prescription arises because of a consciousness of a limit in language, a limit that is 
itself prescribed by the scope of inwardness and singularity. In granting the other and myself a 
singularity that is due, prescription becomes a friendly necessity in our communication and 
relevance, rather than a possible offense or desire to dominate. Arising from the ambitions of 
communication and the limits of existence, prescription communicates through subject-
relations, not objective coded content. That is, it prescribes relations that demand each to 
relate to a certain (given) reality, “whose epistemic access according to Niffari…is in the 
contemplation of self-experience” (Coates, 2002, p. 38). Finally, prescription assumes 
variability, like the analogy of the formula in which the equation does not “correspond” to 
actual values in the strict sense of “actual” and of “correspondence”, but to possibilities, 
imaginative possibilities.  
 
Conclusion:  
Perhaps this next standing is a convenient mawqif with which to conclude:  
 
And He said to Me, if your science (‘ilm) is circumscribed, you have no science. If 
your work (‘amal) is not circumscribed, you perform no work. 
And He said to Me, if your work is obligatory, and none of it voluntary, your 
science is established but does not expand. If your work is voluntary, and also obligatory, 
your science is established and does expand.” (Niffari, mw 12:16-17, 1934, p. 45).  
 
In general, this formula guided the whole thesis in relation to both questions of 
religion, and of science studying it. Niffari himself, is not making the distinction in these 
terms as such, or at all, but it is this relation between “science, knowledge” and “work, 
action”, that is both, cyclical and oppositional. The second major point on religion, being 
related to the “work” aspect in this formula, is the idea of “obligatory” only, or “voluntary, 
and also obligatory”. The point all along, has not been to argue that religion’s way of 
communication has to enforce an obligation, and that the obligation no matter my 
relationship to it, must like a law, be enforced. The point rather, has been that religion, 
viewed in this paper within the Islamic tradition and particularly its Sufi variant, is 
structurally built on the notion of prescription, which I will finally and paradoxically define 
here, as “voluntary obligation”, and which is the core of the religious life. Having both 
“theory” and “practice” involved, the religious life “weighs science in the balance of 
intention, and weighs works in the balance of sincerity.” (Niffari, mw 12:21, 1934, p. 45). It 
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is obligatory, at least because it recognizes the existential and epistemic limits that trample 
the communicative medium (language) by which otherness is opened unto. And it is 
voluntary, in the sense that the obligation is taken on board, accepted, that the otherness of 
the other, and of the obligation coming from him/her, is voluntarily welcomed.  
As science emerged as a movement of freeing truth from the shackles of dogmatic 
authority by instituting and developing objective methodologies, I believe it is also this same 
emancipation itself that is restricting other forms of relations in which other notions of 
“knowledge”, “religion”, “communication” are perhaps more relevant, not to the 
methodology of studying religion, but, more importantly, to those studying it. To restrict 
knowledge, in a religious sense, is to block consciousness from direct inquiry into itself, and 
objectivity, despite having to go through certain subjective “reflections”, is prone to make 
this kind of restriction, despite the fact that having to do so, makes it engage with 
“subjectivity” in order to filter it out of the theory.  
Finally, I want to remind and emphasize the central focus from which all notions 
discussed arose; namely, the singularity of consciousness, and the consequent restrictions 
and limitations in the communicative medium in which knowledge (as certain objective 
knowledge) gets verified and legitimized. One must not loose touch with one’s dynamic 
particularity, even in the midst of the general, be this “crowd”, “method”, or “identity”:  
 
And He said to me: the principal thing is that you should have knowledge of what you are, 
whether elect/particular or common/general. 
And he said to me: If the particular does not act on the principle that he is particular, he 
perishes.  
 (Niffari, mw29: 4-5, p. 65). 
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